America is not surprising anyone in Syria!

The history of American foreign policy is full of examples in which Washington has used vastly different groups across different regions of the world, only to either leverage them later in a larger bargain or abandon them altogether once their usefulness expired. From Southeast Asia to Latin America, from Afghanistan to Iraq, non-state actors that have entered power struggles across a wide geography have learned firsthand that American support is not permanent. The developments unfolding in Syria in recent days can be read as a continuation of this historical pattern. The current state of Washington’s relationship with the YPG—the Syrian branch of the PKK—established since the fall of 2014, should be seen as proof that the United States will not support this group’s political objectives. Rather than becoming part of a resolution process, the organization chose to exploit the opportunities created by the Syrian civil war and fell into the illusion that American support and protection would continue indefinitely, even at Türkiye’s expense. Given that Washington has struggled over the past 12 years to define its military presence in Syria as a national interest and has consistently described its support for the YPG as temporary, it would not be an exaggeration to say that America is not surprising anyone.

A ‘TEMPORARY, TRANSACTIONAL, AND TACTICAL’ RELATIONSHIP

In June 2014, ISIS captured Mosul and advanced toward Kobani within a few months, declaring a caliphate—an event that sent shockwaves through the international system. When execution videos from Mosul circulated by American journalists caused public outrage in the United States, Obama—who had resisted intervention in Syria for nearly four years—felt compelled to act. The train-and-equip program had failed, the US avoided supporting opposition groups it deemed Islamist, and Obama refrained from responding militarily even after his self-declared red line on chemical weapons was crossed, instead accepting a Russia-brokered agreement. This deal, which effectively legitimized Assad and enabled him to cling to power, allowed the regime to use ISIS against opposition forces while leaving northern parts of the country under the de facto control of YPG forces. Presenting itself to the US as the only force capable of stopping ISIS, the group opted to drag its feet during Türkiye’s ongoing peace process. In Washington, discussions even began about removing the PKK from the terror list.

The Obama administration responded to Türkiye’s objections by insisting that its relationship with the YPG was “temporary, transactional, and tactical.” Obama’s policy of fighting ISIS by supporting “local forces” without putting American boots on the ground was seen by the YPG as an opportunity not to be missed. Expanding its area of control with US air and intelligence support, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under YPG command began to openly discuss the possibility of reaching the Mediterranean after capturing Manbij. Persistently underestimating Türkiye’s strategic patience and determination, the organization established dominance in many Arab-majority areas—provoking backlash from local populations and tribes—under the shield of American support. While Türkiye continuously pressured its NATO allies over their backing of the YPG, it also offered Washington alternative options in the fight against ISIS. As the US persisted with the same policy, Türkiye began launching direct military operations from the summer of 2016 onward, fundamentally altering dynamics on the ground.

TRUMP: ‘WHAT ARE WE DOING IN SYRIA?’

During his first term, Trump repeatedly announced that the US would withdraw from Syria, but was unable to do so due to CENTCOM’s efforts to stretch the process, Israel’s preferences, and congressional support for the YPG. While Trump questioned what America was doing in Syria, his Secretary of State, Pompeo, defined limiting Iranian and Russian influence there as a national interest—though it was widely understood that the YPG was not a realistic actor for fulfilling that role. As a president who opposed the Iraq war and the nation-building project, Trump declared ISIS defeated and wanted to leave Syria. Although he attempted to do what Obama had not—bombing the Assad regime to punish it—Trump was never convinced that Syria constituted a vital American interest. In Afghanistan as well, Trump sought to withdraw by negotiating with the Taliban, adopting a policy shaped by the American public’s opposition to “forever wars.” During the Biden era, the relationship with the YPG largely continued along the same lines, while Türkiye pursued its own policy through various military operations and by protecting Idlib despite pressure from the Assad regime and Russia.

Just before Trump’s second presidential term, the fall of the Assad regime signaled a new phase for withdrawal from Syria. The Shara administration’s diplomatic performance over the past year culminated in meetings with Trump at the White House and a security agreement with Israel. Trump insisted on coordinating the Syria file with Türkiye through Tom Barrack, whom he appointed as Special Envoy for Syria. Viewing Türkiye as the dominant winning actor in Syria, Trump sought to withdraw without leaving behind Afghanistan-like chaos, understanding that this required Shara to consolidate control over the country. Shara’s openness to working with the US in the fight against ISIS eased CENTCOM’s concerns, while the security agreement with Israel helped overcome objections from Israel—and by extension, the US Congress. Although the YPG continued to resist the implementation of the March 10 agreement supported by Türkiye, both the Shara government and local tribes brought an end to YPG control in Aleppo and Raqqa.

For Washington to withdraw from Syria, it must downgrade its relationship with the YPG and insist on implementing the integration agreement with Damascus. From this perspective, Türkiye’s military presence capable of shifting the balance on the ground, its long-standing and consistent support for the opposition, its protection of Idlib despite serious risks, its diplomatic moves through the Astana process to limit Assad’s reach, its determined fight against ISIS, and its efforts to prevent the expansion of US support for the YPG all stand out as critical moves. Ankara’s willingness to pursue alternative solutions and coordination with the US on one hand, while not hesitating to carry out limiting military actions against the YPG on the ground on the other, has become a key pillar of its strategic posture.

At this stage, it is evident that America’s relationship with the YPG is not fundamentally different from its other historical precedents. As a capital adept at adapting to shifting power balances and producing new policy, Washington appears aware that—even if it does not fully sever ties with the YPG—it must reduce the level of that relationship. This could create a meaningful dynamic in terms of preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and ensuring stability. Over the past year, Syria has avoided being dragged back into civil war and chaos, and sustaining this trajectory is critical both for regional stability and Türkiye’s security. The United States is compelled to reassess its support for the YPG as the strategic picture changes, and Trump was never fully convinced of the relationship to begin with. Washington’s preferences are adjusting to shifting realities in Syria, and as a result, a reduction—and eventual end—to support for the YPG in the coming period is hardly surprising.