‘First slowly, then suddenly’: Predatory hegemony and the erosion of American power

The March–April issue of Foreign Affairs features an article by Stephen M. Walt, a leading figure of the realist school, titled ‘The Predatory Hegemon: How Trump Wields Power’. It offers an extremely revealing and important perspective for understanding Trump’s approach to foreign policy. Walt says it is partly correct to describe his foreign policy as nationalist, realist, mercantilist, imperialist, and isolationist, and argues that Trump’s second term can be defined by the concept of ‘predatory hegemony’. According to Walt, this approach – in which Washington’s privileged position is used to extract concessions from both allies and adversaries – may achieve partial success in the short term, but in the long run it will not serve America’s national interest. Instead, it will undermine its hegemonic position and accelerate its decline.

PHASES OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY

Walt divides the different manifestations of American power into three periods: the ‘benign hegemony’ of the Cold War, the ‘arrogant hegemony’ of the unipolar era, and the ‘predatory hegemony’ of Trump’s second term. He notes that during the Cold War, although the U.S. dealt with its allies in a tough-but-fair manner, it was not essentially trying to weaken its partners. He reminds us that in the unipolar era, America – unable to control its hubris – took missteps like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but its aggressive policies were limited to ‘rogue regimes’ and did not target its allies.

Trump’s understanding stands out as trying to secure maximum concessions and privileges by engaging in one‑on‑one bargaining with all actors, without distinguishing between friend and foe. Instead of a stable, mutually beneficial relationship, this policy aims for the U.S. to come out ahead in every relationship and weaken the other side as much as possible. ‘Predatory hegemony’ makes no distinction between allies and adversaries, treating the balance of power as a zero‑sum equation.

While predatory hegemony leads America to bully its allies – such as those in Europe and Canada – it also forces Washington to seek trade deals with stronger rivals like China. Using sanctions and tariffs as economic weapons, Washington seeks economic concessions in return for providing military protection. At the root of its aversion to multilateralism is the effort to grab the largest possible share of the existing pie, rather than enlarging the pie so that everyone gains more.

According to Walt, the key difference that distinguishes predatory hegemony from the bullying of weaker states by great powers is that, unless compelled, one does not prefer to make demands that would put allies in a difficult position. Moreover, the prosperity and strengthening of friendly countries are seen as fundamentally positive developments for the hegemon. In the world of a predatory hegemon, the great power is always concerned with gaining more than both large and small actors in every situation. The losses suffered by other actors are seen as the most natural outcome of this retail‑style relationship.

THE PARADOX OF PREDATORY HEGEMONY

Walt’s analysis shows that predatory hegemony risks consuming itself. Faced with Trump’s bullying style, allies such as Canada and Europe are seeking alternatives, notably making trade deals with countries like Indonesia, India, and China. When traditional U.S. security commitments on NATO, Ukraine, and Taiwan become part of economic bargaining, this not only increases security risks in the international system but also fuels instability and unpredictability.

‘Predatory’ moves such as the demand to annex Greenland and the operation against Maduro undermine the legitimacy and credibility of American hegemony by flouting international law. Moreover, Trump’s failure to follow through on his threats leads other powers to conclude that Washington is ‘bluffing’. The images of Canada, Denmark (over Greenland), and Iran (over the Strait of Hormuz) not giving in to Trump’s threats can be seen in the same light. Similarly, if China concludes that Trump will not act on Taiwan and takes military steps, this could have an eroding effect on the international system.

It can be said that the reckless use of American hegemony creates a paradox: Trump gets some of what he wants in the short term, but in the long term he loses credibility, legitimacy, and deterrence. Allies seeking alternatives and adversaries unafraid of Washington’s coercive power reinforce this trend, weakening American hegemony.

One could criticize Walt’s framework for overstating the maximalist aspects of Trump’s foreign policy. For example, some will argue that Trump’s trade policies, by modestly increasing the country’s national capacity, have limited China’s advance, especially in high technology. In this context, it could be argued that Trump’s policy is not limited to being predatory but also contains a geo‑economic strategy. Furthermore, one could point to increased NATO security spending and the fact that U.S. allies in Asia (such as Japan and South Korea) are trying to tie themselves even more tightly to Washington.

Nor can it be said that just because the U.S. is unreliable and unpredictable, China’s greater acceptance (compared to the past) means China is more reliable. Some will also argue that it is too early to predict the failure of Walt’s predatory hegemony strategy. Of course, these criticisms have some merit, but beyond them, Walt’s clarification of how Trump’s foreign policy differs from the U.S.’s hegemonic postures in other periods makes an important contribution to the literature.

Trump’s approach – focusing on power balances without distinguishing between ally and adversary, and trying to maximize national interest at the expense of other actors – stands out as the fundamental difference that sets him apart. It is hard to argue that America’s hegemonic power will disappear in the short to medium term, but in the long run, the thesis that this power is being undermined will find an audience. Walt, quoting Hemingway, predicts that American power will decline ‘first gradually, then suddenly’. This prediction also points to how much the belief that Trump’s America will somehow be ‘the kid who comes from behind to win’ has diminished.