Iran’s resistance and America’s Hormuz deviation...

After Vice President JD Vance’s talks with Iran ended in failure, Trump announced that they would close the Strait of Hormuz. This step, which aims to break Iran’s control by preventing countries like China from buying oil, raises a big question mark over how feasible its implementation really is. Requiring the U.S. Navy to seize or attack ships flying third‑country flags, this move could quickly turn into a gift for Iran. The effort to blockade Hormuz, which has the potential to drag America into conflict with other nations, would not only increase international oil prices but also fail to have a sufficiently deterrent effect on Iran. By closing the Strait of Hormuz and allowing passage only to the ships it wants, Iran has cornered Trump; in the heightened tension that would follow U.S. forces attacking vessels of other countries, Iran could gain an even greater advantage.

IRAN’S NUCLEAR STUBBORNNESS IS NO SURPRISE

During the two‑day talks held in Islamabad over the weekend, the U.S. side announced that no agreement had been reached because Iran refuses to give up its nuclear program. This outcome is of course not surprising at all, since it is not reasonable to expect Iran, which has never abandoned its nuclear program since the 2000s, to give it up after having paid such a heavy price. The main reason Iran has been subjected to attacks by the U.S. and Israel was precisely its refusal to renounce its nuclear capacity. It was a complete irony that Trump, who pulled out of the agreement made with Obama, then moved to eliminate Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, claiming that Iran was not complying with the deal. Trump’s launching of another war to eliminate nuclear capacity – after he claimed to have completely destroyed Iran’s nuclear facilities in the 12‑day war of June 2025 – also constitutes a deep contradiction.

It appears that Iran, whose nuclear facilities were struck and which lost scientists, had prepared for such a war situation and managed to preserve its uranium. The number of those who believe that producing a nuclear bomb is the only way to prevent another attack on the country after the elimination of Khamenei and the political leadership must have increased significantly. While Iran’s not being defeated – which shows the regime will not be toppled – is in itself a success, expecting it to give up its nuclear program as if it had been defeated is simply unrealistic. In this context, it is also quite difficult to understand why the U.S. side went to Islamabad to negotiate on the condition that Iran “renounce nuclear weapons.” Under these circumstances, it can be said that the two‑week ceasefire is aimed more at calming global markets and controlling fluctuations in oil prices rather than achieving lasting peace.

THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF HORMUZ

The most effective weapon Iran has used so far in the war has been its strategy of imposing economic costs by closing the Strait of Hormuz. The weight of the bill it has presented to both its Gulf neighbors and the U.S. economy has pushed Trump toward a ceasefire and, after the failed talks, into a struggle for control of Hormuz. America’s refusal to allow even Iran‑authorized ships to pass through Hormuz could be effective against Iran, but that will not mean ensuring free passage for all countries. While it is doubtful that the U.S. has the capacity to guarantee that, it is certain that Iran will try to make disruptive moves using drones and mines. For America to keep Hormuz open despite Iran, it would have to deploy a large naval force, clear mines and repel drone attacks.

The fact that the U.S. has so far asked NATO countries for help in keeping Hormuz open, and that Trump has used harsh language when that help did not come, shows that Iran holds a strong card. Trump’s promises at the beginning of the war – to provide state‑backed insurance for ships passing through Hormuz and to escort them militarily – also did not materialize. Washington, which has been trying to buy time and build up more military forces in the region, does not seem likely to implement a more effective strategy going forward. U.S. military capacity would have to mobilize enormous resources to fully open or control Hormuz against Iran’s will. Such a mobilization cannot yield immediate results, and the economic costs incurred during this process will continue to put pressure on the Trump administration.

MISSION CREEP

This picture shows that the war has shifted from focusing on destroying Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile capacity to trying to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. This also indicates that in the coming period the war will be fought on a field of Iran’s choosing. Instead of a war in which America can dictate its terms, entering a war in which Iran holds the trump cards can be described as a classic case of mission creep. In situations of mission creep or expansion, it is guaranteed that the war will become longer, more complex and more costly. Even though Trump would like to declare victory and try to open Hormuz through an agreement, he cannot easily extricate himself because Iran demands guarantees that the war will not start again.

From the perspective of Israel’s “mowing the grass” strategy, a limited success can be mentioned. The aim of this strategy – which allows for new attacks on Iran when necessary – is to weaken Iran and thus fully secure Israel’s regional supremacy. Since this strategy largely shifts the economic cost of closing Hormuz onto America, Israel is not very troubled by the absence of a lasting peace agreement. Israel’s real concern is that Iran’s wings be broken and that a continuous state of war, with periodically intensified doses, be maintained. Even though Trump would like to declare victory and focus on other issues, the fact that the war has evolved into Israel’s strategy means that America is not only entering a war it has long wanted to avoid, but also being dragged into a long‑term engagement. Trump’s unwillingness to make concessions to Iran to get out of this equation means that the war will shift further toward the Hormuz front and become even more protracted.