What did the threat to occupy Greenland achieve?

President Trump, who argues that the United States must acquire Greenland one way or another for America’s security, chose to soften the occupation threat by saying in Davos that he would not resort to a military option. Trump, who had announced an additional 10% tariff on European countries opposing the U.S. acquisition of Greenland, also said after his Davos meetings that he was, for now, backing away from this step. It is said that Trump softened his stance in return for Europe’s principled acceptance of negotiating the establishment of more American military bases in Greenland and granting Washington a say in investments related to underground mineral resources. It is also clear that the additional tariff announcements shaking global markets on Tuesday and the roughly 1.8% drop in the U.S. stock market played a role in Trump’s retreat.

That Trump, emboldened by the Maduro operation, issued threats toward Greenland only to soon revert to a purchase option and now settle for military bases shows the impact of quiet Republican opposition against a scenario that would collapse NATO, Europe’s resistance, and market reactions. While the occupation threat confirmed that America no longer abides by the rules-based international system and therefore lacks credibility, it can be said that, even if it worked as a bargaining strategy, it was an unnecessarily exaggerated move. The U.S. could have approached Denmark with proposals such as establishing military bases in Greenland or keeping Russia and China away from the country’s underground resources and still gotten what it wanted; therefore, there was no need for an occupation threat. So what was the purpose of this threat?

From dominance in the Western Hemisphere to the security of the transatlantic alliance

The National Security Strategy published by the Trump administration in December declared that America would henceforth focus on the Western Hemisphere, effectively designating it as its backyard. Immediately after the document’s release, the Maduro operation carried out in early January showed that this strategy would be implemented aggressively. Trump’s America was signaling that it would not hesitate to use force without regard for international law and to disregard other countries’ national sovereignty. In this context, the rhetoric of “we want Greenland and we will take it one way or another” was not something to be dismissed lightly. Harsh rhetoric toward Iran also created the perception that America would move to overthrow the regime. In both cases, Trump stepped back. While speaking of dominance in the Western Hemisphere, he began emphasizing the importance of Greenland being handed over to the U.S. for European and Arctic security, effectively arguing that this move would benefit the transatlantic alliance.

Because everyone knows that Trump opens negotiations from an extremely high position to get what he wants, the occupation threat might have been underestimated. However, what was done to Venezuela made scenarios in which America would use military force to change regimes and expand territory far more plausible. Still, it would be difficult to say that Trump’s nationalist foreign policy, which defends America’s absolute freedom of action, means that it can do whatever it wants. Reports emerged that some Republican senators, along with Democrats, took a stance against the risk of collapsing NATO from within. Europe’s rhetoric about defending Denmark did not mean it could go to war with the U.S., but the potential to disrupt transatlantic trade had to be taken seriously. Trump also could not ignore the reaction of the U.S. stock market to the tariff news and occupation rhetoric. In this context, Trump signaled a softening by returning to the claim that he was trying to strengthen the transatlantic alliance in order to calm everyone down, at least to some extent.

A difficult path to reverse

It is well known that adapting to Trump’s foreign policy style is difficult. With a style that can change positions very quickly and break many conventions, Trump is trying to shift the main axis of American foreign policy. When this foreign policy approach goes beyond using extreme rhetoric as a bargaining tactic, it turns America into an unpredictable and, more importantly, unreliable actor. Trump, who sees no problem in abandoning America’s traditional rhetoric of liberal free markets, freedom, and democracy that underpin the global system, has effectively declared war on this traditional liberal political style. Trump’s criticism of Europe in Davos was in this vein as well, as he views European leaders as globalist elites benefiting from this system. While Trump harshly criticized economic and immigration policies, it is clear that even though he speaks of transatlantic security, he does not truly believe in the transatlantic alliance.

The Trump administration’s claim of establishing dominance in the Western Hemisphere by prioritizing this region shows that it has adopted a vision in which America should be a regional rather than a global actor. It can be said that steps taken in this direction are putting America on a path that is difficult to reverse. Biden’s effort to revive the transatlantic alliance under the slogan “America is back” was not met with much enthusiasm by Europeans. The likelihood that any American president after Trump will be able to revive the transatlantic alliance is very weak. The transatlantic alliance, which was established around the fight against communism as a common ideological enemy during the Cold War and under American sponsorship, will have to move forward with a different content and format in the absence of those dynamics.

Even if NATO does not collapse, we are entering a period in which its deterrent effect is severely weakened; transatlantic trade continues but is undermined by tariffs; Russia and China exploit cracks within the West; and international solidarity diminishes in the face of global threats that endanger everyone. Given these challenges, Washington’s abandonment of efforts to produce a common strategy makes the development of alternative regional and global initiatives inevitable. The development of such initiatives will push America into an increasingly localized position, alienated from world politics. Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric reflects an understanding that expects gratitude and loyalty from allies without bearing the burden of leadership. In this context, the threat to occupy Greenland—issued at the cost of deepening America’s alienation and isolation—creates the impression not of American strength, but of an unreliable actor.