OPINION - Beyond the Ceasefire: What the U.S.–Iran Deal Really Means


Over the past few days, Trump’s language has suggested a growing urgency for a ceasefire.

This was clear in the tone, in the choice of words, in the unprecedented aggressive slang, in the loss of all restraints in his Truth Social posts. This was the language of someone frustrated that Iran was not accepting the terms he wanted.

And what he wanted was quite clear. He wanted a pause in the fighting, and negotiations under that pause; in the meantime, Iran would open the Strait of Hormuz. That, in practical terms, was the “deal” he kept talking about.

Iran, however, was not accepting that framework for some obvious reasons.

Twice before, they were bombed while negotiating with the US. So, from Iran’s side, agreeing to pause, talk, and give up its most important leverage by opening the Strait of Hormuz, would only give the US and Israel a chance to regroup and bomb them again.

That is why Iran’s position was that the Strait of Hormuz would be opened only if there was a complete end to aggression against them, a convincing guarantee that the US and Israel would not attack again, reparations for the damage already done, and acceptance of their broader set of demands.

That was the original Iranian position.

So, when Iran eventually agreed, before Trump’s deadline, to a temporary ceasefire, talks in Islamabad, and opening the strait, it looks, on the surface, like a retreat. It could be framed as Iran backing down under pressure and Trump getting exactly what he wanted.

But this reading is too simplistic.

The nuance is that both sides appear to have compromised, and Pakistan seems to have played a significant role in making that happen.

Given Iran’s previous experiences of betrayal during negotiations, this was not a small concession from their side. So why would Iran do that?

This happened because Iran was convinced by Islamabad that its core demands are not being dismissed outright. We can see a clear indication of this in the White House statement, where it acknowledged that Iran’s 10-point proposal would be the basis for negotiations. This is a significant shift.

If that is true, then this is not a simple story of Trump forcing Iran to capitulation. It is also a story of Iran using military resilience and strategic leverage to bring the United States to a point where Iranian terms have to be treated seriously.

And that would be a major achievement for Tehran.

Because some of these demands are not just wartime asks. They go to the heart of the larger conflict between Iran and the United States since 1979.

Most importantly, the issue of sanctions. Iran’s economic suffocation did not begin with this war. Iran is an oil-rich country should be far more prosperous than it is. Instead, its economy has been crippled for years under US and European sanctions.

So, if this process opens a real path toward lifting sanctions, which is central to Iran’s 10-point demands, it is not just a tactical gain. It is a strategic breakthrough.

It would allow Iran to shed the most crippling burden it has faced for decades, sanctions that have defined its economic reality since 1979, by leveraging this 40-day war.

Then there is the military dimension. Iran has shown no willingness to abandon its missile deterrent, its most critical form of strategic leverage.

This is crucial. Because whatever else this conflict has demonstrated, it has made one thing clear: Iran’s missile capability matters. It imposed significant costs and sustained pressure on its adversaries. This is one of the key reasons Trump appeared increasingly desperate for a “deal.”

The United States had demanded strict limits on Iran’s missile program in its 15-point demands. However, if negotiations proceed based on Iran’s 10-point proposal, which obviously contains no provision for restricting its missile arsenal, then it represents a major strategic achievement for Iran.

So, from Trump’s side, he can claim victory because he got what he kept demanding in last few days: a ceasefire, talks, and the Strait of Hormuz reopened.

And from Iran’s side, however, agreeing to this arrangement reflects calculation rather than weakness. If Tehran concluded that its central demands would now be seriously discussed, then compromising on the format of the ceasefire may have been worth it.

That said, huge uncertainty remains.

Iran has every reason to be skeptical. Its distrust is based on experience. If Tehran senses that this ceasefire is merely a pause before another betrayal, then the consequences will be serious, and the entire process could collapse very quickly.

At the same time, the United States faces its own constraints. Even if Iran’s 10-point proposal is accepted as the basis for negotiation, agreeing to too many of those demands could easily be framed as a defeat for Washington.

With internal political pressures and midterm calculations in the background, the United States will be reluctant to sign onto anything that appears to hand Iran a clear victory.

That is why, despite the White House stating that Iran’s 10-point framework will guide negotiations, the risk remains that Trump’s maximalist 15-point demands will be pushed more aggressively at the negotiating table.

Moreover, Pakistan’s overly close ties with the United States may raise concerns in Tehran about its role as a neutral mediator.

That is why the next two weeks matter so much. The ceasefire itself is only the surface. The real question is what follows.

Can Iran get credible guarantees against renewed attack?

Can it secure reparations?

Can it achieve meaningful sanctions relief?

Can a framework emerge in which it keeps its deterrence while reducing the nuclear issue as a source of escalation?

If the answer to even some of these questions is yes, then this could become a turning point for Iran, not just in this war, but in the wider struggle it has been engaged in since 1979.

However, if the United States proves unwilling to sufficiently accommodate Iranian demands while also seeking to avoid renewed conflict, the critical question becomes how Iran chooses to respond.

The US authorities have already begun to deny that the 10-point framework they accepted as the basis for negotiation corresponds to what Iran is now demanding.

The situation in Lebanon adds another layer of complexity.

On the other hand, despite Lebanon’s inclusion in the ceasefire, Israel launched one of its most brutal air campaigns since the start of this onslaught shortly after the truce was announced, signaling that it does not accept Lebanon as part of the deal.

This places Iran in a highly difficult position. Hezbollah engaged Israel in support of Iran during this conflict. If Iran proceeds with a ceasefire while Israeli operations in Lebanon continue, it risks a serious loss of credibility, and its key ally may perceive it as a betrayal.

So yes, both sides can claim success for now. But the deeper truth is that we still do not know whether this is the beginning of a settlement or simply a more sophisticated intermission in a much longer conflict.

But there is also one factor that may restrain further escalation.

Trump entered this confrontation under the belief that Iran would capitulate quickly under massive bombardment and decapitation. That expectation proved wrong within days and turned into a prolonged and costly war of attrition.

This matters. Trump prefers short and decisive military campaigns and is cautious about entering drawn-out conflicts. That is why he became desperate for a ceasefire when his expected short adventure in Iran turned into a quagmire.

Trump has understood that Iran is not a theatre for a quick victory, and thus he will think twice before restarting his misadventure in Iran.

At the same time, Israel’s role adds another layer of uncertainty. Unlike Washington, it entered this confrontation with a clearer understanding of the dynamics and appears less inclined toward de-escalation. Many of its objectives remain unmet.

So even if the ceasefire holds, the question is not only what Washington and Tehran do next, but how Israel chooses to act.

Author: Ishfak Farhan Siyam

Researcher at International Institute of Law and Diplomacy

*The views in this article belong solely to the author and do not necessarily reflect Yeni Şafak's editorial policy.