US media: Israel Iran uprising plan deemed strategic miscalculation

A detailed analysis by The New York Times concludes that Israeli and US expectations of triggering an uprising in Iran were fundamentally flawed. The report highlights intelligence gaps, internal disagreements in Washington, and Türkiye’s diplomatic warnings, underscoring how assumptions about regime collapse in Tehran failed to align with realities on the ground.

The report by The New York Times reveals that Israeli and US officials misjudged the likelihood of sparking a mass uprising in Iran, despite early optimism during the conflict. The analysis, based on interviews with senior American and Israeli figures, indicates that expectations of rapid regime destabilisation in Tehran did not materialise, exposing critical flaws in strategic planning.

Mossad’s uprising scenario

According to the report, Mossad presented a detailed proposal to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu outlining how internal unrest could be ignited in Iran. The plan suggested that coordinated intelligence operations, combined with early military strikes, could mobilise opposition groups within days and potentially trigger wider instability capable of weakening the Iranian leadership.

The proposal reportedly included scenarios such as targeting senior Iranian leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, alongside psychological and covert operations aimed at encouraging mass protests. Mossad chief David Barnea also presented the same framework to senior officials in Washington during a visit earlier this year.

Washington’s cautious stance

While Donald Trump was described as receptive to the plan, several US intelligence and military officials expressed reservations. They warned that the conditions inside Iran were not conducive to a large-scale uprising, particularly under external military pressure.

Officials argued that widespread airstrikes would likely deter, rather than encourage, civilian mobilisation. “People are unlikely to take to the streets while bombs are falling,” one assessment indicated, reflecting concerns that the strategy overlooked Iran’s internal dynamics and security environment.

Reality diverges from expectations

By the third week of the conflict, joint US-Israeli intelligence reviews concluded that while Iran’s political system had come under strain, it remained intact and operational. The anticipated chain reaction of protests and unrest failed to emerge, reinforcing the view that the initial assumptions were overly optimistic.

The report notes that even within Israel, doubts surfaced regarding the feasibility of regime change through such methods. Former Israeli military intelligence official Shahar Koifman stated that toppling the Iranian government under current conditions was not a realistic objective.

Türkiye’s warning and Kurdish dimension

The analysis also highlights tensions between Washington and Tel Aviv over the potential use of Kurdish groups in Iran. While intelligence agencies had previously explored supporting Kurdish elements, US officials have grown increasingly reluctant to pursue this option.

The report points to diplomatic intervention by Hakan Fidan, who conveyed Türkiye’s concerns directly to Marco Rubio, warning against backing any Kurdish-led initiative in Iran. This stance contributed to a shift in Washington’s approach and added friction with Israeli counterparts.

In parallel, US intelligence simulations conducted prior to the conflict had already suggested that a complete collapse of the Iranian government was unlikely, a conclusion that ultimately aligned more closely with developments on the ground.