The limits of American power

These days, American strategists are debating whether America, despite establishing military superiority over Iran, may have lost strategically. The debate between those who argue it is too early to say Washington has lost the war and those who argue that Iran has become a player in the new regional geopolitics once again reminds us of the limits of American power. Those who argue that the Trump administration, like many previous administrations, fell into the trap of the "short war fallacy," remind us that the war has not achieved its strategic objectives and that an open-ended state of war has become a more likely scenario. The fact that America, despite damaging Iran's military infrastructure, rolling back its nuclear program, and eliminating senior regime figures, cannot impose the outcome it wants in negotiations also shows that Washington's military power is insufficient to achieve its desired political goals.

WHAT HAS MILITARY SUCCESS ACHIEVED?

The Trump administration, unable to define a clear strategic objective at the outset of the war, instead announced a list of demands, leaving vague at what stage and how it would declare victory and end the conflict. It is of course important that the enemy does not know the cards you hold, but here the problem was that it was not entirely clear why America entered the war in the first place. The fact that the war, which was entered under pressure from Israel and in a context where direct American national interest was not threatened, and even the peace negotiations, are subject to Tel Aviv's veto also stands out as a critical anomaly. Despite establishing air superiority over Iran and largely crippling its missile and nuclear programs, Washington has not been able to declare a political victory. The Israel factor is preventing the fruits of military success from being harvested.

As of today, Washington can neither dictate the terms of peace to Iran nor isolate its enemy. It could even be said that its bargaining power has decreased compared to before the war. While the release of a few billion dollars in funds in exchange for bringing the nuclear program under control was being discussed, the press is now reporting negotiations worth hundreds of billions of dollars in exchange for a peace agreement, many articles of which are in Iran's favor. The fact that the Iranian regime has survived and come to a position to control the Strait of Hormuz shows that while political results have not been achieved, the stranglehold over one of the most critical chokepoints of world trade has worked in Tehran's favor. Despite establishing military superiority, the Trump administration has been unable to force Iran to completely abandon its nuclear activities, open the Strait of Hormuz, and withdraw support from its regional proxies.

HAS ANOTHER OPEN-ENDED, NEVER-ENDING WAR BEEN ADDED TO THE LIST?

In American history, there are examples such as the Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq wars, which were entered with the promise of a quick result like the Iran war but continued for many years. There are also examples, though much rarer, like the Gulf War, where American power was used in a coordinated manner toward a specific goal. During the George Bush administration, America's attempt at military operation by effectively using international mechanisms to remove Saddam from Kuwait, with the support of its allies, was able to produce the intended political outcome. However, in a context like the Iran war, where Washington flouts international law, pushes political legitimacy to the background, and uses its military power recklessly for the sake of Israel's security, achieving strategic success was already extremely difficult. Washington, which not only set aside coalition-building but also failed to adequately protect its Gulf allies by making them targets, was unable to form a common front against Iran.

The picture that emerges today resembles neither war nor peace. What stands out is a state of uncertainty and low-intensity conflict, which we can predict will become increasingly permanent. While American strategists are not wrong to argue that it is too early to declare defeat, it is clear that declaring victory will be even more difficult. Iran, seeing America's strategic dilemma, continues to raise the stakes, even risking the devaluation of its own trump cards. Iran, sending a message by economically squeezing America's regional allies, appears pleased that the political bill for global economic troubles is being handed to Washington. The Trump administration, caught between Israel's maximalist stance and Iran's use of the negotiation process to its advantage, is unable to take a stance to end the war as soon as possible by prioritizing American national interest.

The Iran war is turning into a war that America can neither win nor end. Washington's military superiority is indisputable, but it is not possible to say that this has translated into a lasting political order. More importantly, because it cannot accept the existence of a strategic chasm with Israel, it does not fully hold the initiative to determine under what conditions peace will be achieved. Washington, which appears deprived of abilities such as defining its own strategic objective, convincing its allies to side with it, making "grand bargains" with rivals like China, and using military operations to achieve political results, seems likely to create a new status quo that condemns the region and the global economy to a constant cycle of crisis and uncertainty.