The Camp David impasse

A recent report from the U.S.-based online media platform Axios revealed that the simmering tensions between Israel and Egypt have been escalating. According to the report, Israel—frustrated by the Egyptian army’s activities in the Sinai Peninsula—first tried to resolve the matter directly with Cairo. When bilateral talks stalled, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appealed to Washington, urging the U.S. to “rein in” Egypt. Israeli officials accused Egypt of violating the 1979 Camp David Accords, which had limited Egypt’s military presence in Sinai to a symbolic level. They claimed that airstrips were being expanded for military use and underground facilities were being built to store missiles.

In response to Axios’s report, Egypt issued a sharply worded statement condemning what it called Israel’s “aggressive and brutal war of annihilation” in Gaza and rejecting accusations of violating Camp David. But only a few hours later, that statement was withdrawn and replaced with a softer version—one that notably referred to the situation in Gaza as “Israel’s expanding military operations.”

The two countries have already been at odds over discussions about relocating Palestinians from Gaza into Sinai. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has repeatedly opposed such forced transfers, while Netanyahu recently suggested: “Every Palestinian has the right to leave Gaza. I’ll open Rafah for departures, but Egypt will close the door immediately.” In doing so, he appeared to shift the blame for Israel’s actions in Gaza onto Cairo.

To understand today’s tensions, it’s worth looking back. The Camp David Accords, signed in 1979 by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, tied the hands of a powerful Arab nation and left Egypt dependent on American aid. After fighting wars against Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973, Sadat abruptly embraced a pragmatic approach, transforming Egypt from a fierce enemy into a formal peace partner. Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula, which it had occupied since 1967, and in return Egypt stepped back from its role in defending the Palestinian cause. With its most powerful Arab adversary neutralized, Israel felt secure enough to invade Lebanon in 1982, confident that no threat would come from the south. Meanwhile, Sadat paid with his life for signing the agreement—assassinated on October 6, 1981, by an army officer under his own command.

Far from benefiting Egypt, Camp David has consistently weakened its position. Even today, the deal continues to cost Egypt and the wider Middle East dearly. The agreement emboldened Israel, making it more reckless across the region while offering Egypt little in return. Israel’s constant provocations—while shirking its own responsibilities—should force Egyptian leaders to reassess Camp David.

The world is also changing. Opposition to Israeli policies and to Zionism is growing globally, creating a new reality that makes old regional arrangements increasingly irrelevant. Humanity is moving toward a time when long-standing political taboos will be discarded. This deep and justified anger toward Israel will not fade—it will harden, spread, and gather momentum. Those who live long enough, the text warns, may one day see a world where being Israeli or Zionist brings shame, rejection, and isolation.

For Muslim-majority nations, this is a moment to reconsider their ties with Israel and make decisive choices before it is too late. Enough time has been lost, and too high a price has already been paid.