It is not just about Yemen, but Saudi Arabia’s return to the stage

Saudi Arabia’s (SA) unexpected reaction to the developments in eastern Yemen in the final days of last year suddenly exposed a grand plan that has been quietly taking shape across the Middle East. Within this revealed plan lay a story of betrayal, encirclement, and a so-called ally working for its own interests for a long time—at the expense of its other partners. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia’s long silence, which had surprised everyone, turned out to be part of a major plan that, in fact, everyone was already aware of.

Everyone knew very well that the UAE was not truly a loyal ally of Saudi Arabia, but was acting solely in its own interest. Everyone could see that Operation Decisive Storm—ostensibly launched against the Houthis and supposedly aimed at stabilizing Yemen—had long since lost any connection to decisiveness, and that Yemen was gradually turning into a state of total fragmentation, producing unending chaos and security problems along Saudi Arabia’s borders.

This trajectory was not the result of coordinated action by the Coalition. On the contrary, it was the outcome of a secret plan by one partner (the UAE) against another. And the issue was not merely an “internal Yemeni” power struggle or something limited to Yemen; it was the visible emergence of a much broader chessboard aimed at reconstructing an architecture of influence stretching across the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden–Horn of Africa corridor.

Saudi Arabia’s move around Mukalla and the diplomatic ruptures that followed show that Riyadh has transformed a rivalry it long conducted “covertly” into an explicit state policy. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s accusation that the UAE helped Yemeni separatist leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi escape; claims that Zubaidi traveled by sea from Aden to Somaliland and then via Somalia to the UAE; and, in parallel, developments such as the pushing back of the STC (Southern Transitional Council) on the Yemeni front all point to a new phase in Saudi–Abu Dhabi relations—one defined not by alliance but by outright competition, even hostility.

The fact that the scenario the UAE activated in Yemen has been replicated in Syria, Sudan, and Somalia reveals the existence of a grand design in which the UAE plays the leading role, but whose ultimate beneficiary is Israel. It is impossible for Saudi Arabia not to have noticed this. Indeed, the move in Yemen that surprised everyone shows that Riyadh has been aware of this for some time and has now decided that it is time to put a stop to it.

As we have said before, resolving the crisis in Yemen—establishing a stable administration and creating a secure border for Saudi Arabia—was not particularly difficult. However, the shared anti-Muslim Brotherhood sensitivity that emerged among the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt pushed Yemen further away from an easier and more direct solution. It now appears that this sensitivity was exploited in a very different way, especially by the UAE, to better manipulate both countries. After all, the Muslim Brotherhood is an organic fabric embedded too deeply in Yemen’s social structure to be uprooted. Fixation on opposing it can turn into a battle against windmills. This obsession sidelined all rational strategic solutions and gradually led to the deeper encirclement of both Saudi Arabia and Egypt—until they were confronted with the real and far more serious threat.

The space the UAE opened for armed militias in Yemen under the banner of the Southern Transitional Administration, and the space it opened in Sudan by arming the Rapid Support Forces, follows the same model as Israel’s investments in the SDF in Syria. In the end, neither Israel nor the UAE has real sociological weight or depth in these regions. Yet through these moves, they aim to encircle Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye by leaving them to grapple with persistent border problems. This has always been Israel’s way of constructing strategic games: it does not want strong states in the region. Even if there appears to be hope for “normalization” with Saudi Arabia and relations are maintained through U.S. mediation, it is impossible for Israel to see Saudi Arabia as a natural ally. The games played through its now fully exposed relationship with the UAE increasingly lay bare this hostile dynamic.

Until now, particularly because of its positive approach to normalization and the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia had almost begun to be seen as a country under Israel’s influence. However, the current trajectory shows that it is impossible for Saudi Arabia not to recognize the Israeli threat—or to fail to see the role the UAE has played in this process.

In this context, Saudi Arabia’s recent moves in Yemen are not merely tactical military interventions; they represent a belated but critical awareness in the face of this fragmentation model. Riyadh has realized that keeping Yemen weak directly threatens its southern borders and its regional position, and has seen that the proxy politics pursued by the UAE ultimately amount to an encirclement strategy serving Israel’s interests.

In conclusion, the examples of the RSF in Sudan, the SDF in Syria, the STC in Yemen, and Somaliland in the Horn of Africa are all components of a systematic fragmentation model operated through the UAE and reinforcing Israel’s regional interests. This model aims to transform the Arab world from a collection of strong states into a set of manageable, fragile zones. Therefore, the issue is not the internal problems of individual countries, but a strategic orientation that will determine the future of regional sovereignty itself. Any resistance developed against this model will shape not only the political fate of a single country, but that of the entire region.

There is no doubt that this move by Saudi Arabia has the potential to reshape the entire map of alliances that has prevailed in the region until now. It may well be a picture of Saudi Arabia’s return to the regional political stage.