Seizing Iran’s uranium stockpile would be complex, dangerous operation

As the US contemplates a potential military operation to seize Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium, experts caution that such a mission would confront significant intelligence, military, and logistical hurdles—from locating the material to extracting and transporting it under hostile conditions. “It would be difficult to identify, locate, and extract all of it,” Richard Nephew, a leading American expert on sanctions and nuclear nonproliferation, told Anadolu. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran had accumulated approximately 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60% purity—one step below weapons grade. However, the status of part of that stockpile remains unclear following 2025 strikes and the suspension of regular inspections.

Location uncertainty

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in March that the stockpile had been buried under rubble at damaged nuclear facilities and that recovery is possible, though Tehran has no immediate plans to retrieve the material. President Trump has stated that Washington will retrieve the uranium but acknowledged the process would be “long and difficult.” Robert Kelley, a veteran nuclear engineer who worked in the US nuclear weapons complex, told Anadolu that the stockpile may have been moved ahead of anticipated strikes. He pointed to a May 2025 Iranian communication to the IAEA stating Tehran reserved the right to take “special precautions” to protect its enriched uranium—suggesting preparations to relocate sensitive material. The IAEA confirmed in a derestricted document that it could not verify the “current size, composition or whereabouts” of Iran’s reserves.

Dangerous mission

US media reported that military planners briefed Trump on a complex extraction operation potentially involving thousands of troops and heavy equipment over several weeks, including neutralizing defenses, parachute assaults, and securing extraction zones. “It would probably require hundreds – if not more than 1,000 personnel to do this effectively – and presumably that would be while under fire,” Nephew said. “No one would recommend that.” Kelley noted that even under the assumption the material is at Isfahan, the operation would be highly complex: “They’d have to dig under enemy fire, and bring food and sleeping quarters. It’s a pretty big dangerous operation.” The US previously secured nuclear material abroad during Operation Sapphire in 1994 with Kazakhstan’s cooperation—a condition absent in Iran.