Will the new F-16s make us more dependent on the West?

I would never believe in a thousand years that I would "agree” with a Greek professor’s statement against Türkiye.

But it’s true. He is absolutely right.

Considering that even today many “Turks” argue the opposite, it contains heartwrenching reality.

Deputy Minister of Education and Religious Affairs, Associate Professor of International Law and Foreign Policy Angelos Syrigos stirred reaction among the strong Greek lobby in both Athens and the U.S.

He said, “We want Türkiye to buy the F16s. Though, not now, but in the long term. Because we want Turks to be controlled by the West.”

His words, as a minister/academic of a semi-invaded and capitulate state, may seem contradictory, but that is a different story. His “hope” for Türkiye should be considered the harshest curse.

He mentions a fact we have been fighting against for almost a century, and both reminds and confirms the intense S-400 discussions in Türkiye, which eventually faced sanctions from the U.S., our “ally and friend,” the conflicts involved in the process that resulted in our exclusion from the F-35 project, of which we were partners and on which we invested billions of dollars.

When you buy such weapons from another country, your associated strategic and life functions become open. This is exactly what happened.

Why do we buy them? There appears to be two reasons: First, out of the need to cover up in the short/medium-term the deficiency in the air security system. At least until our own home-built aircraft take off. Second, perhaps as a part of the give-and-take settlement arising from the F-35s. Because they would not be willing to pay up.

These are parts of the main subject. The primary matter is that these aircraft will be used for years. Once you do it, you will have to continue to cooperate with the U.S. with respect the defense industry and training – even if not as much as in the past. This is the core matter. Especially training. Our pilots were called there for training even as part of their play regarding the F-35s' delivery.

It is the decades-long training partnerships required to maintain the exchange that kills us. The side and sub-industry branches necessary for domestic productions are cut off saying, “we don’t need them, we buy them ready-made.”

We already analyzed this policy in depth during the S-400 discussions. There is no need to delve further into the matter, but just a reminder, a new additional suggestion:

I wrote a column on Sept. 16, 2020, titled, “Türkiye’nin hikayesi” (Türkiye’s story).

“I am currently reading a book comprised of former Air Forces Commander İbrahim Fırtına’s interviews with a series of former air forces commanders (“Alçalmadan Yükselenler,” Kırmızı Kedi, 2020.)

“Naturally, there is mention of dozens of aircraft names/models in these interviews. The number of aircraft purchased, when they were purchased, and how much they were used is among the information footnoted for the purposes of informing the reader. You realize a little later that thousands of aircraft were bought from the U.S. since 1940.

Necessities and conditions always present strong excuses, but it doesn’t end when you buy these aircraft. Including the NATO process, spare parts needs, their renewal, and most importantly, your training and personnel all go through the West’s procedures. And this continues for years and years.”

The new book recommendation is, “Türk Ordusunda Batı Etkisi” (Western Effect on the Turkish Military(, November 2022, E. Çiftçi, Kronik Publishing. It brings us from 1940 to 1960. Of course, what follows is worse. Hopefully it will be completed, but you can take a look at between 1945-60. You will immediately see how the seed transforms into a wild forest.

Now, if they asked Greek professor, “Should Turks be given American F-16s, or would you say, ‘no, they will use them on us,’” what would he say?. That is where he is right. The reactions he drew from his own country and the U.S. are proof of this.

Hence, when you say “local and national,” it makes them and some others go crazy.

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson’s statement that he is “sure Türkiye will approve their bid to join NATO, but they cannot fulfill all demands required by Ankara as a price for this approval,” and the fact that he did this in the presence of NATO secretary general, and in fact, Stoltenberg editing this statement saying, “Sweden is abiding by the memorandum signed with Türkiye,” came as no surprise.

We don’t yet know Türkiye’s official view. But, the statement, “Türkiye is saying they demand things that we cannot do at the same time, or things we do not want to give,” is important.

What don’t they want to give? The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Fetullahist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ).

There were two strange points when all this was being established.

First, the fact that NATO was not included in the memorandum was criticized. The criticism concerned why NATO was not noted – as witness, for example – and claimed that the Turkish Parliament had the last say.

If this statement from Sweden is part of the first signs of sidestepping, it is clear that not only will it not pass through the Turkish Parliament, but it will not even reach it.

Second, there was no focus on the question of why Finland is associated/tied to Sweden’s membership.

These suspicions lead to question Sweden and Finland’s sincerity regarding NATO membership. If it does not happen, it will show Türkiye in a bad light, and will start the, “What will we do with Ankara” discussion in NATO.

We discussed these membership bids from two perspectives: “Let’s quickly approve it, we are after all a NATO member,” and “Let them fulfill the conditions first, then we will approve.”But there were also those whose voices weren’t loud enough: “We should not approve whether they fulfill the conditions or not.”

Perhaps they will be heard a little louder now.