Getting past Hormuz is not enough to end the war

While the Trump administration is spreading hope that the Iran war will end before the November elections, the pressure the conflict exerts on regional economies and the global financial system is taking on new dimensions. The Houthis' advance along the Yemeni coast and their attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure are deepening the gulf between Washington's calculation to reduce the war's impact and its regional allies' security concerns. Despite the Pentagon's statements that the Strait of Hormuz is open and Trump's claims that peace is near, Iran is trying to increase the pressure. Even if a deal is reached, it is unclear whether oil can be exported safely.

At this stage of the war, countries seeking to reduce Iran's and its allies' capacity to disrupt regional and global energy flows by moving the struggle beyond the boundaries of Hormuz are turning to alternative routes. As seen in the Houthis' seizure of Bab-el-Mandeb, the fact that energy routes come under threat makes it harder to keep the war's economic cost manageable. The interest rate hike announced by the Fed, which Trump has been pressuring to cut rates, can also be read in the context of the war's financial costs. The fact that politicians, seeing that stubborn inflation figures and high oil prices could carry a heavy political cost in the November midterms, are pushing a resolution through the House of Representatives to end the war with Iran points to the growing pressure on Trump.

THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO HORMUZ

The statement by the American military that commercial transit in Hormuz continues and that the blockade against Iran is being enforced shows that Washington is trying to send the message that it retains control. However, the fact that oil tankers can pass is not enough to show that trade has normalized, because the necessity of military protection, high insurance costs, and shipment delays create economic pressure even when the strait is not completely closed. For Iran, even making the reliability of transit questionable—rather than succeeding in halting the entire flow—stands out as a success that increases its bargaining power.

Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline, which it is trying to develop as an alternative to Hormuz, is of strategic importance in this respect. The line connecting the country's eastern oil fields to the Yanbu Port on the Red Sea has the potential to reduce the Saudis' dependence on Hormuz, but the maximum capacity of this line is at a rather limited level of around seven million barrels per day. Having such an infrastructure does not in itself mean an export guarantee either, because this pipeline is part of a broader security chain. Any link in the chain of transporting, storing, loading at port, and delivering oil to the buyer coming under threat also turns into a separate security problem.

The threats Iran creates at different points of alternative geographic routes through allies like the Houthis narrow exporters' safe and economical options. It should be noted that different shipment routes carry different risks—for example, a shipment going north from Yanbu through Egypt and one going south through Bab-el-Mandeb do not carry the same risks. The UAE's line extending to Fujairah also bypasses Hormuz without using the Red Sea. Different points have different risk profiles and different security requirements, but Iran does not need to close all routes with a single move anyway.

THE COST OF THE WAR

From Iran's perspective, the strategic return of the security and economic pressure it has created through its allies in Iraq and Yemen is clear. The message these actors' attacks send to Washington is that the cost of military pressure on Iran will also be reflected on America's regional allies and the world economy. Beyond supporting Iran, the Houthis are gaining ground along the region's coasts and strategic islands, strengthening their hand in their internal struggles in Yemen and increasing their weight in regional bargaining.

French President Macron's emphasis that alternative oil routes are needed shows that the struggle in the region directly affects Europe as well. While the atmosphere of conflict and instability in the Gulf manifests in Western capitals as economic pressure and voter dissatisfaction, it is clear that time is also needed to create new routes. The problem before Washington is how to reduce the pressure on its allies while reducing the risks on itself. Opening a new front against the Houthis in the Red Sea could introduce a new dynamic that increases the cost of resources and munitions. America's calculation to end the war and its allies' security expectations, such as Saudi Arabia's, may also diverge.

AN ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND STABILITY

The Wall Street Journal editorial's proposal for military cooperation between Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt shows that, along with the search for a response to the regional impasse through military intervention, hope has not been abandoned for a return to the Abraham Accords. However, it must be seen that a shared perception of threat against Iran and its allies will not be enough to produce a common war objective. It is also obvious that different objectives—such as protecting oil exports, reducing the Houthis' missile capacity, and pushing them back in Yemen—are perceived differently by these three countries. It is not easy for them to agree on how much risk each country will take and what kind of regional order should be established after military success.

The exclusion of an actor like Türkiye from discussions on regional security and stability in such articles shows that the perspective of who Israel can work with and how is being prioritized over regional dynamics. Goals such as reducing tension, seeking economic stability, limiting energy costs, and opening the way for trade are among Türkiye's economic priorities. In addition to these, there is a Türkiye ready to support the security of the Saudis, as seen in the Mecca Agreement. If there is to be lasting normalization in the region, it depends on eliminating the environment of insecurity created by Iran and its allies and ensuring permanent normalization. This equation can only be possible through the coming together of forces that will establish regional security and work to remove pressures on trade.