This is an open conspiracy against the Mecca Pact

One. The US invaded Iraq and then left it to Iranian influence, opening the way for Tehran to become a regional power. Now we are watching a parallel process. Iran, which lost strategic ground in the Caucasus with the Karabakh victory and saw its regional depth weakened with the fall of the Assad regime, is now expanding in the south after the US-Israeli attacks. Of course, this was not Trump's aim. But he could not defeat Iran by military means. Iran, for its part, is trying to emerge from the war with a strategic gain by changing the status quo of Hormuz. And it does not stop there. It is seizing Bab-el-Mandeb (the coasts of the strait facing Yemen and Perim Island), which may have even more impact on the world economy than Hormuz. It is said that the Houthis also want to charge fees from ships passing through Bab-el-Mandeb. If Iran can establish a new regime in both Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb, this will be the greatest compensation it obtains from the US-Israeli attacks.

Two. Israel is uncomfortable with the Mecca Pact. The reason is not only the emergence of an opposing bloc that could threaten its interests. Saudi Arabia was one of the important pillars of the imagined Israel-centered regional architecture scenario (the Abraham Accords). Israel wanted to reach the Arab world by normalizing with Riyadh. Moreover, Riyadh was to play an important role in the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor) project, which would make Tel Aviv the "center of gravity of the region." Israel also wanted Gulf oil to open to the world through its own territory. However, the Gaza genocide and the diplomatic network established afterward with Türkiye's encouragement pushed Riyadh away from the Abraham Accords. In the analyses published in the Israeli media about the Mecca Alliance, the approach that "we must pull Riyadh back to a position where it will talk to us" is quite dominant.

UAE AND IRAN SHOOK HANDS

Three. During the war, the Gulf country Tehran targeted most was the UAE. But the balance is changing rapidly. For a long time now, no notable attack has been organized against the UAE. Iranian and UAE leaders came together at the BRICS Summit. They spoke of "leaving the past behind and looking to the future." The UAE's problem these days is more with Saudi Arabia (they also greeted the Mecca Alliance with grumbling). Riyadh had carried out airstrikes at the end of 2025 against UAE-backed groups based in Aden, Yemen. While the Houthis seized Bab-el-Mandeb, these UAE-backed groups did not lift a finger.

Four. By seizing Bab-el-Mandeb, Iran has gained another very substantial card against the US, which wants to impose an economic blockade on it. But this move does not target the US alone. In the final analysis, after the core of the Mecca Alliance, the Regional Quartet (R4), began its work, Iranian-backed groups in Iraq and Yemen intensified their attacks on civilian and energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. The Houthis are imposing a blockade on Riyadh alone in Bab-el-Mandeb. Iran's first reaction to the Alliance (to Riyadh) was in the form of "instead of expecting security from others, change your policy."

The critical development is this... The part reflected in the press: Iran's proxy forces in Iraq struck Saudi Arabia's East-West Oil Pipeline at six separate points. The part not reflected in the press: It will take at least a month to repair. It could stretch to two months. The line will remain closed during this time. This line was Riyadh's lifeline due to the Hormuz blockade. It is a major move.

WHAT WILL THE MECCA ALLIANCE DO?

Five. Riyadh coming under attack naturally puts the Mecca Alliance at the center of discussions. I read that an American senator asked, "Will the Alliance not take action?" There are similar analyses and questions in the Israeli media. Some of these questions reflect curiosity armed with a lack of information. Some target the Alliance's credibility by implying that it will remain on paper.

Let me explain it this way: The Mecca Alliance held its first meeting in Istanbul in recent days. The agenda was institutionalization and the roadmap. The three members first decided to complete institutionalization (this may take about a year. At this stage, there will be no admission of new members.) Meanwhile, the domestic legal procedures necessary for the agreement to become active must be completed, and the armies must recognize each other, with joint exercises and training activities carried out within this scope. These are the stages required for the defense alliance to come into effect. In other words, we are still in the initial phase.

Furthermore, joint defense does not necessarily mean operations in which land, sea, and air elements directly participate. Its range is wider: it sometimes includes diplomatic support, sometimes intelligence sharing, sometimes military consultancy, or defense industry experience sharing and exchange. I believe many developments that have not been reflected in the press have taken place on these matters.

Six. Now let us sum up: Israel wants Riyadh to distance itself from the Alliance and draw closer to it (according to the Jerusalem Post, Netanyahu, unlike Trump, who rejected Crown Prince Salman's request for support, has stated that he is ready to participate in a large-scale military operation against the Houthis if an official request comes.) Iran is squeezing Riyadh while consolidating its second card against the US in Bab-el-Mandeb. The UAE is shaking hands with Iran while watching the Saudis being punished in Yemen. So let me end with this question that will make you say "What next!": Did Israel give Iran the intelligence about the Saudi oil pipeline?