Trump's election calendar, Netanyahu's war calculus

Reports that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu pressed Trump to launch a new military operation against Iran immediately after the November 3 elections once again lay bare the difference between these two leaders' strategic priorities and calculations of political cost. Israeli officials deny that Netanyahu applied pressure, but the fact that Trump wants to give diplomacy more time shows that they are making different calculations. Netanyahu, who had earlier stated that he would not take a military step before the American elections and would thus not put Trump in a difficult position, is now in a hurry to strengthen his own position in coalition talks, having emerged weakened from the Israeli election results.

The corruption investigation against Netanyahu and the pressure of the election results have increased, and it is clear that he will not give up his advocacy of war until regime change in Iran is achieved. Trump, for his part, is aware that regardless of the outcome of the midterms, he cannot derive great political benefit from a military operation in the face of an American public that opposes war. The depth of the gulf between Trump's and Netanyahu's calculations is of a nature that will determine the fate of war or peace. In this equation, Israel's pressure on Washington for a military operation means insisting on the continuation of a war the American people do not want, which in turn means that Netanyahu does not shy away from endangering the relationship with America for the sake of his own career and ideological preferences.

NETANYAHU'S WEAKENING POSITION

In the October 27 elections, the right-wing bloc led by Netanyahu won 53 of the 120 seats, failing to reach the majority needed to form a government on its own. The fact that the opposition led by Gadi Eisenkot also won 48 seats and is likewise unable to form a government indicates that the coming few months will be dominated by talks aimed at forming a coalition or a national unity government. Eisenkot could sideline Netanyahu by forming a coalition with the Arab bloc, which came to the fore with a success of 19 seats, but his harsh rhetoric against Arabs relatively weakens this possibility. If a national unity government is formed, it may not accept Netanyahu as prime minister.

These scenarios show that Netanyahu's options in the coalition negotiations will be limited and that, to overcome this, he will prefer to return to a new war equation together with America. A new military operation could place national security at the center of the political agenda and force the opposition to join a national unity government. The argument that strong leadership is needed in wartime could also keep Netanyahu in the prime minister's office, at least temporarily. Of course, it is possible that this scenario would strengthen the thesis that Netanyahu is going to war to stay in power and that the cost of the war would cost him even more political ground. War may create risks that endanger his political position, but it may also create new political opportunities.

While Netanyahu wants to increase his options in domestic politics, strategically he does not consider a weakened but surviving Iranian regime sufficient. Arguing that Iran will rebuild its nuclear and missile capacity, he maintains that regime change is the ultimate solution. Netanyahu, who fears that Trump will make a deal with Iran in which sanctions are eased or lifted and Hormuz is opened in return, is worried that Trump will settle for a limited victory and abandon Israel's more comprehensive goals. A scenario emerging from the elections in which he cannot form a government on his own, combined with Washington's current emphasis on diplomacy, makes the military option even more urgent for Netanyahu, but Trump's calculation is different.

WHY DOES TRUMP WANT TO WAIT?

Trump is aware that the idea of striking Iran again right away, as Netanyahu wants, and completely eliminating the nuclear threat is not very realistic. It is noted that the nuclear facilities known as the "Pickaxe Mountain" cannot be eliminated even with America's heaviest bombs, and that only the use of a tactical nuclear weapon would destroy this facility. It is not known whether the intelligence indicating that nuclear activity has resumed at these facilities is Netanyahu's propaganda, or what the true nature of these facilities is. It is also clear that an operation in this region would push the Iranian regime much further away from diplomacy. The fact that a regime that has managed to survive until now has shown that it can threaten global energy security indicates that any new operation, even if it forces Tehran to make more concessions, will not produce a clear political outcome.

Trump must sense that if he returns to war, he will have to deal with uncontrollable and unpredictable consequences, as in the case of the Hormuz crisis. It is not difficult to predict that Iran's retaliation against American bases and regional allies will be heavy and that the rise in oil prices cannot be controlled. It is also known that inflationary pressure on the American economy will increase and that the war will become regionalized. Returning to the Iran war, which is expected to cost him heavily in the November 3 elections, will increase the cost of an already unpopular war. The fact that Trump, while signaling a major attack, is at the same time giving time to diplomacy conducted through Qatar and other intermediaries shows that he is taking these risks into account.

The fundamental difference between Trump and Netanyahu stands out as the American president wanting the war to end somehow, while the Israeli leader's preference is for the war to continue until the Iranian regime is overthrown. Rather than this scenario, which does not look like a very realistic option, Trump prefers an agreement in which Hormuz is opened and which contains clauses that appear to be concessions on the nuclear issue, differing from Netanyahu, who sees the continuation of the war as the strongest option. However, it would not be realistic to expect the difference between these two to turn into a complete rupture, because Trump thinks he can achieve the result he wants only by keeping the military option on the table. If he thinks it will strengthen his negotiating position, he may decide to embark on a new operation. Netanyahu sees war as the continuation of his political career and the only way to weaken Iran, and he will continue to press in this direction. Trump, for his part, prefers to extract a victory from the war he is in. The differences in calculation between these two will determine not only the fate of the war but also the future of the America-Israel relationship.