Astana and the upcoming Erdogan-Putin summit...

Türkiye has signed a comprehensive agreement with the legitimate government of Libya related to the extraction of carbon assets from the eastern Mediterranean. In my last article, I evaluated this as an affirmation by Türkiye of its presence as a major power in the eastern Mediterranean, and its strength is based on its historical past. Reaction to this matter did not take long.

Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias rushed to Egypt. Dendias and his Egyptian counterpart Sameh Choukri made statements condemning Türkiye and declaring this agreement void. They claimed that the Tripoli government, which failed to win the elections, had lost its legitimacy and could not conclude such an agreement.

This assessment is consistent with the recent statement issued by the United States of America, France, Germany, and Italy. The statement stated that Dbeiba and Haftar, two parties in Libya, had expired, and they could not have a role in the future of Libya. Accordingly, they stressed that forming a new Libyan government would be better. It seems that we are facing a closed view that rejects the Turkish presence in the eastern Mediterranean, and also rejects the deepening of Turkish-Libyan relations. Egypt and Greece make this closed view the subject of exaggerated comments.

Let us suppose that this thesis is correct; There will be a transition. Is not the legitimate government of the country ratified by the United Nations is the government of Abdul Hamid Dbeiba until elections are held and a new government is formed? Politics may experience interruptions in some places, but it does not accept a vacuum.

Even if this imagined transition is uncertain, the Dbeiba government does not lose its legitimacy until this transition is achieved, and the decisions taken by that government are valid. Moreover, the issue of transition is far from the situation that has just been accepted in terms of the balance of power in Libya and is recognized by both parties.

We can easily say that there is a complex equation presenting itself on the scene. The Western bloc claims that the Dbeiba government has lost its legitimacy due to the inability to hold elections, and it also includes Haftar in this equation. However, the current situation is not a random one in terms of Libyan political culture. Behind each of the two power-centered forces is a highly sensitive tribal support. Ignoring this prevalent in Libya is an ignorant approach. Well, who will take over? This question also has no answer. Who possesses the magical power that enables him to dominate the existing forces and bind them all with a common will?

Tobruk (eastern Libya) is seeking to seize the opportunity. Haftar's wing is taking a cheap approach, claiming that the Dbeiba government is outdated and that legitimacy has been transferred to them due to the inability to hold elections in Libya. As for the Western bloc, it bears responsibility for the situation, telling him, "You, too, stay away from the scene." On the other hand, Egypt and Greece draw their own conclusions from this mess and continue to comment on the matter in a way that ensures Türkiye is excluded from Libya.

I have already made clear that there is no basis for the agreement with Egypt; Egypt, like Greece, does not want Türkiye to consolidate its power in the Mediterranean and to develop its influence in Africa. Accordingly, it has absolutely no interest in the watersheds it lost in the maritime agreements it had with Greece. And those who say: “If Egypt agrees with Türkiye, the latter will gain much more” are wrong; Egypt will not back down and will never stop siding with Greece. The European Union countries, especially France and Germany, and the Emirati-Israeli duo were also included in this equation. The United States of America, whose main concern is the Black Sea and the Montreux Convention, will also support attempts to pressure Türkiye in the Mediterranean region.

The way out for Türkiye, of course, is to strengthen its position and try to find someone to support it. An agreement with Russia on the Libyan issue may be the first step towards that. It is imperative that Russia now looks at Türkiye from a different perspective. Where Russia faces the problem of the presence of France, which imposes itself firmly in Africa, and the latter is also in conflict with Türkiye. And Russian influence is increasing in Mali and Chad. There is no doubt that the African initiative launched by Russia and Türkiye in their circle, raised France's concerns and fears. However, Russia's support for Haftar, and Türkiye's opposition to him, is in France's interest more than others. What if the matter was reversed, and Türkiye and Russia agreed?

The last thing Russia wants is a war between Greece and Türkiye. However, Greece, which supports Ukraine against Russia and supports anti-Russian campaigns, is therefore on Russia's blacklist. Greece continues its provocations for the outbreak of a Turkish-Greek war in parallel with the Russian-Ukrainian war. If NATO and the European Union put their weight in Greece's favor, what would Russia do?

And the war that Russia is fighting now prevents what it wants to do. Perhaps the Russian political and military class will see that things are worse for them without an agreement with Türkiye. Russia should change its policies in the Mediterranean region and in the whole of Africa, including its policies in the Turkish world (Turkistan) in Asia. It is also possible to repeat this scene in the opposite direction for Türkiye. Finally, Türkiye and Russia, which are at odds in the Mediterranean, must find common ground and consult each other on what to do. If not, the picture will become bleak for both of them. And who knows, when Erdogan and his Russian counterpart Putin, which will be held Thursday in the Kazakh capital, Astana, may possibly be the turning point.