China’s Gulf landing

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia with a large delegation. This was one of the most important events in recent times. This gave Jinping the opportunity to meet with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as well, including Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Dozens of investment deals were signed in the trade and energy fields. Considering that the trade volume between China and Saudi Arabia has already increased by 200 percent in recent years, it shouldn't be hard to guess how far these new deals will boost this volume. China did not stop at this. It made similar deals with Saudi’s arch-rival Iran as well.

This course of events must have primarily disturbed the U.S. Compared to U.S. President Joe Biden’s pretty dull Saudi Arabia visit, the picture becomes clear. Though statements from the U.S. are quite calm, we can tell that it is unhappy about these developments. It is clear that Saudi-U.S. relations are no longer what it used to be after the U.S. hastily abandoned Afghanistan, and started giving signals of normalization with Iran. Additionally, Biden bringing up the assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi during his election campaign, and directly accusing the crown prince had further shaken up relations between the two states. As far as we understand, Saudis used the money to prevent any likely investigations in the U.S., but at the same time developed a major grudge against the Biden administration. It showed no interest in the sanctions imposed in relation to the Russia-Ukraine war. It cooperated with Russia through OPEC and refrained from boosting oil production despite persistent calls from the U.S. and Europe. It further increased its growing trade relations with China. In addition, it gave the green light to make payments not in U.S. dollars but in Chinese Yuan.

Relations between China and the Gulf Arabs are yet to gain a strategic dimension. Saudis and the UAE are continuing to purchase weapons from Western states and companies, including the U.S. This constitutes the lifeblood of the conversions between Western and Gulf states. But who knows what might happen in the future? If China-Gulf relations gain a strategic depth, everything will turn upside down.

Though China has taken an economic withdrawal route, it is not disregarding its world expansion. According to some analyses – for example, as stated by Prof. Fahri Erenel on our foreign policy and international relations television program, Akıl Odası – this step indicates that China has shifted its Africa expansion further south. In other words, this is a decision that slightly leaves out of contexture the Russia-Turkestan-Caspian lines including Turkey, which it was planning in Asia. Of course, there is an explanation for this. These lines seem politically threatening due to the numerous potentials for regional conflict within, and because they are open to all sorts of intervention. There is no question that the Russia-Ukraine war put a crimp in China’s connection to Europe. The Turkestan line does not seem very reliable to China with respect to the Uighur issue. China is clearly disturbed by the established Russian and developing Turkish influence in this region. Cooperation between Russia and Turks in Turkestan will not make China happy. The currently operating natural gas pipelines between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan and China are enough for China. Thus, China wants to suffice with this. In other words, it is making use of the One-Way pipelines in Asia for energy flow only. The Gulf and Iran move is different. It includes major investments.

The line that includes Pakistan, Iran, and the Gulf is now China’s new favorite. It seems to be the most on-point option that keeps China logistically close to both Africa and Europe simultaneously. The critical matter here is how Israel-China relations will follow.

This line, which is strengthened by China, is forcing it to be active in Syria and Iraq as well. It is quite clear China will be cooperating here with both Russian and Iran. Thus, we can project that China will now increase its influence in Syria and Iraq. Additionally, it will come as no surprise for China to stand firmly alongside Russia and Iran behind the Bashar Assad regime. We need to take into consideration Syria’s efforts to rejoin the Arab League. This shows that China will make use of Arab nationalism-based support. Surely the most important matter in terms of Türkiye will be the nature of relations China develops with the Democratic Union Party (PYD). Lastly, we must not forget China’s outbursts directed at preventing Türkiye’s ground operation in Syria.

Thus, Türkiye is making efforts to increase its influence in Turkestan. It is striving to connect the Kazakh and Turkmen energy lines with Europe through the Caspian-Ceyhan. In other words, it is working towards boosting its significance over Europe. It is making efforts to stabilize relations with the Gulf. But under any circumstances, the most critical aspect for us is China’s involvement in the equations in Syria and the Caucasus in unpleasing ways.