How far does geopolitics go?

We find ourselves witnessing the war between Russia and Ukraine in the north of the Black Sea with astonishment, and the brutality carried out by Israel in the Levant region is nothing short of horrifying. Of course, in these wars, the fire initially burns where it falls. But wars are not limited to the fighting parties alone. Many states, whether close or not to the region, become involved in the process. The UK and the US are sending warships to the Levant. Southern Cyprus has almost turned into a base where Western special forces gather. A vigorous stance condemning Israel emerges even from Latin Americas beyond the Atlantic. In short, the impact of wars in the global world is always more extensive than usual. Everyone takes positions based on the nature and course of a war, whether it is distant or nearby.

The analyses are mainly based on geopolitical structures. We tend to view wars as confrontations between nation-states expressed in political maps with matte colors. Consequently, the perception that wars primarily take place among states and the nations affiliated with them is established.

I won't underestimate geopolitical evaluations, nor will I neglect the theopolitical evaluations associated with them. Nation-states are indeed fundamental structures of modern times, and I cannot object to that. Both nations and states emerged as the basic political formations of the modern world based on industrialization. The issue is related to how far we can view these structures as integrated entities.

Let's consider states. States, of course, harbor the potential for conflict and war among themselves. However, conflicts also prevail within the structure of a given state. There are ongoing struggles between old elites and new elites, bureaucracy and technocracy, military elites, and civilian elites. The unity of nations with states, guided by different minds, is not something that happens spontaneously, as often thought. Bismarck, for instance, managed to bring together the German principalities by, figuratively speaking, beating them into unity. Nations, both among themselves and internally, witness various wars, such as class struggles. Therefore, treating nations and states as unified blocks is a problematic perspective.

Modern societies are industrial societies, introducing an economic structure called capital. Marx delved into this phenomenon, emphasizing its depth, which I still consider an issue that has not been fully overcome. However, the problem here is that Marx often evaluated capital and the social classes inherent in it as a block. Over time, it has been understood that the classes holding capital also show a tendency to differentiate within themselves. I believe this involves several main elements. The first is the capitalist groups dedicated to real (manufacturing) economy. For example, the Ford family embodies this ideal type. There is also another group related to vital energy production for industry. Rockefeller represents this ideal type. Finally, there is a third group that chooses the path of being primarily involved in finance, funding the economy and making a profit from it. The Rothschild family, with many affiliated groups, is known for its excellence in this sector.

Industrial discipline manifests itself in two dimensions. The first is the pacification of class struggles. The second is balancing the three capital groups mentioned above. The critical risk is that the financial sector, the most aggressive of the three, always has the potential to challenge this balance. In a balanced and value-producing disciplined economy, the volume of monetary assets is kept under control. However, in situations where production stumbles in the economy for one reason or another, the financial capital disrupts the balance and becomes cancerous, disrupting the entire economy.

This evaluation is not enough. What makes the issue even more complicated and challenging for analysis are the transitions between these three sectors. For example, companies that have gained weight in the energy sector can later become investors in the manufacturing and finance sectors. A company with a gravitational center in energy expects returns from its financial investments to meet the requirements of its own gravitational center. If Rockefeller ventures into finance, he will likely want to channel it towards his interests in the energy field. This approach is not a guarantee that the financial sector, which always holds the center of gravity, will create a parallel with the Rothschilds. I believe that much of what has happened since the 1970s can be attributed to the relationships between energy and money. Let's not forget that the 1970s were the times when the efficiency of capital and labor in the US economy began to decline. The events of this decade, namely the Nixon Shock in 1971, known as the Reserve Currency and the rise of finance over the US Dollar, and two years later, the 1973 Oil Crisis, set the fate of the 21st century, which was christened with the fall of the Wall.

Another valuable point that I find in Marx is his observation of the historical change capacity of the productive forces, roughly referring to technology. This is manifested by the Chip revolution that began in the 1950s and the Blockchain, which highlights the main dimension of today. It is obvious that the world we know, the industrial world, is collapsing. Some call it the knowledge society and economy, but in my opinion, plain techno-capitalism is on the rise. Both energy and financial gravity centers are deeply involved in this process and have now begun to clash among themselves. Some want to accelerate the overcoming of the exhausted industrial capitalism and transition to a new mode of production, exchange, and consumption as soon as possible. Others are concerned with delaying this process as much as possible. Some want to mobilize new technological possibilities for the sake of sustaining the old; others want to use them to build a completely different world. The geopolitical movements our world is experiencing are shaped between these two impositions. The inadequacy of the geopolitical narrative of wars lies precisely here. Two geopolitical powers are not really colliding. It is the finance-centered capital against the world-centered energy, not one geopolitical against another. Everywhere—between states, within states—but everywhere. The geopolitical narrative will make sense only if it is told not as a block but in relation to these aspects.