On Türkiye’s normalization with neighbors

Türkiye’s recent foreign policy style has been multi-sided. Frankly, this is the way it should be. This is not an easy craft. On the one hand, you are going to have problems with local forces, on the other hand, you are going to make efforts to develop cooperation with them under different headings. This is exactly what the current state of Türkiye-Russia relations and, even if not to the same extent, Türkiye-Iran relations show. The implementation of the zero problem policy with neighbors might perhaps be a good-willed, yet very idealistic expectation. The developments that are in effect have already shown that there is no truth to this.

In most cases, idealism gives rise to results completely opposite to expectations. We are set on the path based on this principle. Yet, we don't have a single neighbor with whom we have no issues. As a matter of course, we are at each other's throats with some of them. The more reasonable approach is to refrain from escalating tensions despite problems, avoid reflecting them onto other problems, and gain the capacity to develop cooperation in such cases. This is what Türkiye has been trying to achieve recently with Russia, in the first degree, and with Iran in the second degree. 

One other highly disputed matter is over the “shift in axis” concept. It's sometimes impossible to help but wonder who is on which axis in international relations. Even if there was such a thing once upon a time, it no longer exists. The critical mistakes made in foreign policy stem from taking too seriously this axis presumption. 

Nothing in interstate relations can endure either dispute or agreement. Don't get me wrong, this does not mean interstate relations have a chaotic, anomic structure in which all states stick to their guns. In terms we can understand, courtesy lie methods apply here. You can make even the most unacceptable, most impossible policies legitimate if you make it look like you are going by the book. These principles give no direction to foreign policies. In other words, they are not determining. Quite the contrary, they are determined based on various interpretations. 

If we were to take the Arab Spring as a bearing point, we can see clearly now that Türkiye’s isolation at the regional level, incapacitating it is one of the most striking results of this. We should have avoided falling for this game. We did not have to fall into this situation with either Syria or Egypt or Israel. A simple comparison is enough to grasp the situation. Prior to the 2010s, Türkiye used to be in the arbitrator position between Israel and Syria – with the approval of both sides. Then we suddenly became enemies with both. Thankfully the Turkish state moved away from this position, especially post-July 15. The Astana processes prove this perfectly as well.

There are recent efforts towards mending relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Israel. These efforts have given rise to numerous interpretations as well as great expectations. Yes, we have the Russian experience. The Turkish and Russian states were able to recover and stabilize their relations despite various obstacles from downing planes to ambassador murders. We even sat at the table with Iran as the Astana trio. (Despite Iran's outbursts, Türkiye is doing the right thing in the Azerbaijan-Armenia issue and is at least not adding fuel to the fire.) We should not wait for these improvements to present an absolute result. Furthermore, we must not expect the same process applies to the other states with which we are currently working to expand towards. Let us now look at the actors individually.

Greece is the clearest example that confirms our theory. There is no math to base normalization with Greece, which is backed by the U.S., and the EU - primarily France. Türkiye needs to end at once those exploratory talks, which are nothing but a waste of time, and deter Greece with its hard power. Anything other than this will be seen as Türkiye’s weakness, and will further encourage Greece’s impudence.

It is clear that normalization with Israel will not happen overnight, and that a lot more effort is necessary. Israeli authorities’ statements confirm this. A far-right government coming to power under Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership does not make it any easier. The most reasonable outcome is limited to keeping the relative reconciliation as a gain.

The convergence with Saudi Arabia and the UAE was interrupted as well. We must not forget that the recently developed Arab nationalism, backed by China and Israel, targets Türkiye as much as it does Iran.

The events that took place immediately following President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Egyptian leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s agreement, Egypt’s announcement of the FIR line and MEB through Greece and South Cyprus puts Türkiye in a difficult position. Egypt is stipulating Türkiye’s withdrawal from Libya as the condition for normalization. There can be no negotiation where conditions are imposed anyway.

The worst is the recent news of normalization between Türkiye and Syria, efforts towards a meeting between Erdoğan and Syrian leader Bashar Assad. Erdoğan would not even give Assad the time of day. Despite this, Assad is still laying down conditions.

The zero problems with neighbors policy has caused us enough problems already. We must avoid making the same mistake again. It is not always possible to clean the spilled milk.