Sochi's Aftermath

The eagerly anticipated visit of President Tayyip Erdogan to Sochi has taken place. Erdogan and Putin met after quite a while. This was a rather lengthy meeting, lasting for three hours, which could be considered quite substantial. The statements made by both sides did not seem to encompass the content of such a lengthy meeting. It is apparent that the discussions on deep matters during the hours-long meeting have been kept in the secret notebooks of the two leaders. Very little has been disclosed to the public, and I believe this is the result of a mutual agreement between them.

The first noteworthy point was the warm and cooperative behavior displayed by both leaders towards each other. In fact, the friendly atmosphere between the two leaders, in light of recent developments, has surprised those who had assumed that Türkiye had made its decision after the elections, returned to its default settings, turned its back on Russia, and leaned towards the West and NATO. This has led to a change in Turkish-Russian relations from their honeymoon phase, which had left many perplexed. Both Erdogan and Putin spoke of expanding the volume of their relations further. It is crystal clear that Russia and Türkiye have renewed their determination and commitment to continue compartmentalized policies. This is even more striking considering some critical developments that occurred after the elections. Among these, the most significant was Türkiye's green light for Sweden's NATO membership and its strong emphasis on its position within NATO during the recent NATO Summit in Vilnius, as well as the renewal of its EU aspirations. It is hard to believe that Russia did not notice these developments. Russia has reacted calmly, refraining from responding to such statements, which, of course, it would ultimately find uncomfortable. Russians are aware that Türkiye is a NATO member, so they understand that Türkiye's options are limited in this regard. Therefore, they did not make an issue of Türkiye's pro-Western rhetoric at the NATO Summit.

However, the most striking development occurred afterward. Zelensky visited Türkiye, and subsequently, a group of AZOV commanders, known to be staunch Nazis, were returned to Ukraine with the condition that they would reside in Türkiye until the end of the war. This was an even more difficult development for Russia to digest. Despite a series of condemning statements and harsh articles in the Russian press, Russia decided to bite its tongue and quickly simmer down its reactions.

Russia is aware that Türkiye has leaned towards the West due to its economic and financial difficulties. Russia has not hesitated to support Türkiye in this regard. For instance, they delayed natural gas payments and shifted funds to the Central Bank of Türkiye. Furthermore, Russia knows that it will not be uncomfortable with Türkiye, which has somewhat stabilized its economy. They understand that this situation will increase Türkiye's capacity to develop more independent policies.

The course of Türkiye-Russia relations is quite peculiar. In the Mediterranean and Africa, the two countries find themselves head-to-head. For example, while Erdogan and Putin were meeting, Russia was bombing elements associated with Türkiye in the Idlib vicinity, and, in return, Turkish troops and artillery were retaliating against Russia-affiliated elements. In the Mediterranean and Africa, it can be confidently said that Turkish-Russian relations are characterized by competition and even animosity. (It shouldn't be this way, and it would have been better if it wasn't.) However, when it comes to the Black Sea and Central Asia (Turkistan), the atmosphere completely changes. Both sides are extremely sensitive about pursuing a balanced and understanding policy towards each other. Türkiye has managed to remain neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war until today. By using its rights and authority derived from the Montreux Convention to close the Black Sea to warships, Türkiye has greatly relieved Russia. The two countries collaborated, at least until the equation changes, on the issue of the Grain Corridor. During the Azerbaijan-Armenia war, Russia did not intervene, despite persistent calls from the Armenians. This created an opportunity for the Turkish side to reclaim a significant portion of the occupied Karabakh territories.

Russia is well aware that Türkiye has leaned towards the West due to its economic and financial difficulties. Russia hasn't hesitated to support Türkiye in this regard. For example, they deferred natural gas payments and provided financial support to Türkiye's Central Bank. Moreover, it's quite evident that Russia doesn't mind Türkiye, which has managed to stabilize its economy to some extent, pursuing more independent policies.

The trajectory of Türkiye-Russia relations is quite peculiar. In the Mediterranean and Africa, the two nations have found themselves in direct opposition. For instance, while Erdogan and Putin were meeting, Russia was bombing elements affiliated with Türkiye in the Idlib vicinity, and in return, Turkish troops and artillery were retaliating against Russia-affiliated elements. It can be confidently stated that in the Mediterranean and Africa, Turkish-Russian relations are characterized by competition and even hostility. (It shouldn't be this way, and it would have been better if it weren't.) However, when it comes to the Black Sea and Central Asia (Turkistan), the dynamics change entirely. Both sides are extremely sensitive about maintaining a balanced and understanding policy towards each other.

Türkiye has managed to remain neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war until now. By using its rights and authority derived from the Montreux Convention to limit the presence of warships in the Black Sea, Türkiye has greatly eased Russia's concerns. The two nations have collaborated, at least until the equation changes, on the Grain Corridor issue. During the Azerbaijan-Armenia war, despite persistent calls from the Armenians, Russia did not intervene. This provided an opportunity for the Turkish side to reclaim a significant portion of the occupied Karabakh territories.

After the elections, Türkiye has somewhat shifted its political and strategic priorities away from its struggling economy. Financial resources from the Atlantic world, where we are knocking on the doors, do not come with such concerns. They require Türkiye to make far more political and strategic concessions, in essence, to surrender. What they want is for Türkiye to become a puppet of their Atlantic policies in the Black Sea and the Caspian, just as Greece has done in the Mediterranean. They are essentially saying, "No money unless you comply." These matters go beyond the capabilities of savvy money dealers. Türkiye has attempted to thaw relations with the West by pushing its limits. We made statements implying that we would get closer to Ukraine to a certain extent. Even more dramatically, we pushed the boundaries of courtesy by engaging in joint exercises with the U.S. Navy's most advanced aircraft carrier, the Gerald Ford, and by allowing the U.S. to exclude us from the F-35 program, which had already lost its primary function due to Türkiye's TCG Anadolu ship. I believe such efforts are in vain, and the political and strategic costs are quite heavy. Erdogan must have realized this as well, considering the strongly worded statement he made, which I believe carries the traces of deep disappointment with the United Kingdom. We are accustomed to Erdogan's similar statements about France and Germany, but it's the first time that the UK, criticized by Türkiye at the presidential level, has been so openly criticized. It appears that Türkiye, facing economic challenges, has come under pressure to change its Black Sea and Caspian policies. If Erdogan and Putin discussed concerns about the UK in Sochi, I wouldn't be surprised...