The interregnum of Europe and the loneliness of Eurasia

I have pointed out many times in these columns that the Russia-Ukraine war is as much, perhaps more so, an Anglo-American war with Europe as it is a NATO-Russia war. The U.S. and England are collapsing into Continental Europe by giving all their weight. With Biden's coming to power, the process started to work. Biden rolled up his sleeves with the slogans "America is coming back" and "We will strengthen NATO". The invoice was issued to Ukraine. The sanctions imposed on Russia actually set Europe as their target.

From a more microscopic point of view, it is possible to place this in the competition between England-Germany and U.S.-Germany. Let's unpack this a little bit. Starting from the 1970s, both the U.S. and the UK entered a period of heavy economic losses. The economic crises experienced also pointed to this. Beginning in the 1970s, we have witnessed many crises in the U.S., the Pacific, and Latin America. Have you ever heard of a German-origin crisis? The German economy neither caused a crisis nor was it affected by the crises. From the 1990s to the 2000s, Germany was a shining star, dominating the EU with its stable economy. So much so that when the EU was mentioned, Germany directly came to mind. So how did they achieve this?

Germany had some historical advantages. Foremost among these was a cultural characteristic of the German nation. The German nation is known as the most advanced and productive nation in the world. It is known to everyone that working and producing on the basis of the strongest discipline, cooperation and organization are the unchangeable qualities of the German nation. These are indispensable qualities of industrial societies, and Germany gives it the ideal type. It takes a lot of work to find a German who complains about working.

Another cultural advantage of Germany is that it has not been in trouble with the consumption phenomenon, which signifies the disintegration of industrial societies. It should be kept in mind that the issue of consumption is not simply a natural aspect of production. The consumer society expresses the dissolution of the production society. The German nation, unlike the US society, is not fascinated by consumption. The average German, perhaps under the influence of strong puritan traditions, limits his consumption habits to the functional requirements of maintaining his productivity. It puts what it produces into domestic consumption only as much as necessary. It exports the rest. You see world-class German cars in wealthy Arab countries, not in Germany, but in the U.S. The competition between the two Germans is experienced not over-consumption, but over-production. Germany could not adapt to electronic transformation as much as Japan and digital transformation to South Korea. But he always managed to maintain his superiority in the field of machine-chemistry.

During the First and Second World War, Germany paired its high productivity with passionate militarism. In the end, he was defeated, making the world pay a heavy price. After the Second General War, he was demilitarized as the chief criminal of the war. This was supposedly a punishment given to him. But it turned out dialectically to Germany's advantage. Beginning in the 1970s, while the U.S. and England began to experience heavy production losses, Germany, which was freed from the burden of military expenditures, maintained its vitality as an economy whose economy was constantly growing and had a surplus in world trade. It increased its influence within the EU, excluding its partner France. It enabled him to dominate the Balkans and Eastern Europe, which joined the EU after the Cold War. Moreover, it launched the Eurasia and China expansion. His grave mistake here was that he regarded Eurasia as consisting of Russia, with which he had close cooperation in terms of energy. The other pillar of this was inevitably Türkiye. But he could not intimidate Türkiye, which had entered through the workforce. He even got closer to Iran. But he consistently excluded Türkiye. However, if he had done the opposite and added Türkiye to the EU, he would have been in a completely different situation right now.

The Anglo-American world has brought Germany to its knees over the Russia-Ukraine war. The German-Eurasian link has been severed. The dynamic that raised Germany is now pulling it down, again as a quirk of dialectics. His military weaknesses keep him away from being a political subject. The will that detached him from Russia also distances him from Türkiye, which is already weak. (The clowns of burning Qur'an are plotted for this.) The line, which goes down from the Baltic, including Eastern Europe, and extends to Crete, isolates Germany from the world. The center of the new Europe is Poland, sharpened to Germany as well as Russia. Other Eastern European states are also in the lineup. The new Europe, in which Germany has withered, is now an Americanized Europe as never before seen in its history. This is not Elysee Europe. The last Macron-Scholtz meeting can only be the elegy of Elysee Europe.

The next decades will be a period of withering away, in which the hope of becoming European by thinning and civilizing is replaced by sectarian Eastern European vulgarity. It can also be called the interregnum period of Europe. When we come to Eurasia, we encounter a deep loneliness. Let's give the devil has due: They succeeded… A Eurasia isolated from Europe; A Europe isolated from Eurasia has neither taste nor goodness.