The Resolution Process and guardianship relations

Let's think simply and remember the background, which has a correspondence in the minds of a vast majority; the Kurdish issue didn't happen without reason. It was born as a reaction to the Turkism politics, which has been imposed by militarist-guardianship focuses. These reactions were denied at the beginning and were disregarded. Later on, it was expanded through humiliating oppressions and tortures. It gave birth to armed structures and turned into endless conflicts that killed thousands of people.

Right at this point, we gradually started hearing about the “Resolution Process” from official authorities. Let's expand this. What did the government promise? Essential topics can be arrayed as; recognizing the Kurdish reality, abandoning oppression and denial politics, recognizing the fact that Kurdish people also live in this country, removing the obstacles in front of the Kurdish language, and granting equal citizenship rights to Kurdish people.

By taking action, a substantial part of these important topics were realized. A state of emergency was already removed. On top of that, the armed government forces, who were present in the region more than they were supposed to due to extraordinary conditions, withdrew. Despite all the preventions of secret structures, negotiations began. Imralı Island (referring to Öcalan) and Qandil had been included in these negotiations. Meanwhile, life became normal. The regional community, who has never seen a normal daily life since the 80s generations, started having normal lives and started focusing on their duties for the first time.

It was time to unite normalization within the political-judicial frame. It was clear that this was a constitutional matter. However, in order for the politics to process, it was necessary to prevent military structures from surrounding the process. Right at this stage, everything reversed. Now, it seems like spring is over. There are various reasons for that. AK Party changed expression towards the June 7th elections in order to regain the votes they lost due to the process and shifted to MHP, and since they though that AK Party-supporting Kurdish votes were already in the bag. As we criticized a couple of times, AK Party formed a “rightist” expression. In the end, it lost a substantial amount of its political power and cogency in the region. However, they could have emphasized their contribution on the path to normalization and promised to change it into a clear, understandable and promising politics within the New Turkey vision.

On the other hand, over the developments in Syria, HDP experienced a focus shift that would disrupt a Turkish resolution. Over Kobani and Rojawa, HDP pulled the Kurdish public to a pan-Kurdist platform. This shouldn't be interpreted as not having the right to be interested in the happenings in the region. Of course, in the same way that Bosnia is taking care of their Muslims, it's necessary to take care of Kurdish, Turkmen and Arab populations in Syria. However, this shouldn't have been done by disregarding the dynamics in Turkey. HDP did this. Instead of filling the gap, which had been opened by the withdrawal of government forces, with civil attempts directed at normalizing lives, they did not take the slightest precaution against the risk of having that gap invaded by Kurdish militants or developing an attitude against it.

Finally, HDP became a partner of the front against AK Party. However, two political actors of the Resolution Process shouldn't have turned the election rivalry into animosity. Unfortunately, they did. So much that, HDP did politics by targeting the party, which was their only foundation in the “Resolution Process” and attempting to regress the guardianship-militarist traditions. In my opinion, at this point, all HDP had to do was to develop an attitude against the guardianship and militarism. In fact, I'm having difficulty understanding people that say, “This much shouldn't be expected from HDP. That would be cruelty.” The success of the political resolution can only be possible by deactivating guardianship and militarist structures. HDP can become a meaningful political experience if they can break the Qandil militarism and guardianship. If their ontology is limited with mediation, then where does the “becoming Turkish” claim stand?... Of course, as of the minimums of democracy, approving HDP's closure or removing the rights of their parliamentarians is not possible. If such a process is started, I must say now that we will approach it critically and never approve it. However, I cannot understand the view, which attracts attention to dangers like HDP's isolation and alienation to politics and thus attempts to legitimize the inability of HDP to succeed in carrying out this responsibility. If HDP is going to be like Hezbollah in Lebanon, then we can easily say that it will not contribute towards their “becoming Turkish” claim or their democracy accumulation in Turkey.