Towards the 2023 elections...

It was not easy for Turkish thought and cultural life to be freed from European influence. Ottoman and early Turkish modernization was largely Continental Eurocentric. In particular, it was of French and German origin, which rose on the basis of strong publicism and statism. In a way, for the Ottoman elite, who had ancient state traditions and had the issue of perpetuity, modernization on the publicist axis fed with organic ideas was the key to salvation. Both ancient and modern statism were ultimately paternal. Organicism, semi-ideological structures that emerged after the Second Constitutional Monarchy, or rather, this was the common denominator of the movements. Island Europe, especially America, was like a fairy tale in the distance behind Mount Qaf. A narrow Young Turk circle like Hoş, Sabahaddin Bey was developing shocking analyzes on the values of the island Europe. But the dominant could not be effective against the dominant one.

The Republic was founded on the French model. Those who criticize the official doctrine in one way or another were actually not far from the culture that surrounded the founding administration on the basis of organicity. “Deep thoughts” were guiding each of them. In this context, the nebula of "ideological thinking", as Alev Alatlı puts it, plagued our intellectual and cultural life. In this nebula, thinkers and ideologues were often lost from reality.

Everything started to change after the Second General War. Our political-social culture began to flex with the inclusion of NATO and the coming to power of supposedly more liberal and democratic powers that softened the founding principles. Unlike the nasty Europeans who tire us out, we started to get along with the "friendly", "candid", "witty", "practical thinking and acting" Americans. And their consumption standards fascinated us. Of course, this transformation was not instant and easy. In America's decades between 1950 and 1980, organic political and ideological structures still maintained their rigidity, especially under the influence of the Cold War. The right, from the moderate to the militant, does not take the American style very well on a cultural level, but perceives no threat from them; on the contrary, they felt indulged in the U.S. and NATO as they prevented Muslim Turks from falling victim to the Muscovite atrocities. The left, on the other hand, was fiercely opposed to the U.S. and NATO. Well, the United States was not bothered by it. He was already producing, aligning, and pouring the anti-communist tendencies into the pot he wanted. The situation was no different for the left. First of all, he divided the leftist youth, who were studying at various schools and universities and who were against US imperialism, into Russian-Chinese cliques and had them hurt each other.

Right-wing governments, which dominated after 1950-1980 and supported by NATO, practically recognized the true face of the U.S., from Menderes to Demirel. I think it would be superficial to consider these periods as struggles between Americans and anti-Americans. When we look more concretely, we understand that the conflict is between the U.S. and the right-wing powers that it nurtured and brought to power, that looks American on paper, but after a point sees its true face and gets stuck.

The fracture started after 1980. The right and leftists, who suffered the wrath of the military coup, provided their political rehabilitation through liberalization. In fact, this was a strategy that the U.S. developed and spread globally to maintain its hegemony after the Cold War. Turgut Özal, who came to power in 1983 and became the leader of the new right, was the true representative of Americanization in Türkiye. The new left was also supporting him in various ways. U.S. imperialism was no more. Everyone was relieved. That magical concept of globalization, which developed based on a liberal economy and liberal politics, was concealing the Americanization of the world, meanwhile Türkiye. Everyone, from the left to the right, was a little bit American through the consumption networks. Those who criticized it were accused of being dinosaurs. The new right and the new left were making fun of their own dinosaurs and knocking them down. Well, they weren't even wrong in places. Those who kept their anti-imperialist feelings could not renew themselves, and they showed a residual landscape because they repeated the rote of the Cold War era.

This liberal wave brought the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party to power. But starting from the March 1st Memorandum, things always went wrong. The Gezi incident, the failed coup attempt of July 15, tell of the major breaks in this path. The liberal wave left the ruling AK Party. I do not see this as a small political triffle. This is outright in line with the U.S. sacrificing Türkiye. This is what is critical. The 2023 elections, the 100th anniversary of the Republic, require a deep showdown. Türkiye will comprehensively evaluate the developments in the world and the transforming balance of power and choose a new path for itself. One of these ways, to put it bluntly, will shrink Türkiye again in the format desired by the U.S.; the other, if it can be brought to life through a firm and detailed doctrine, will rise. The second way is much more difficult. Because it necessitates reckoning with both the U.S. outside and - more difficultly - with the U.S. within.