Why does Israel always attack Palestinians during Ramadan?

As I visited Jerusalem just before the start of Ramadan, the weather was magnificent, with a serene and peaceful atmosphere that could have led one to believe that the occupation had come to an end, were it not for the Israeli soldiers standing at every corner with automatic rifles. The Damascus Gate was adorned with Ramadan lights, the vendors had taken their places, and the people of Jerusalem had already begun their traditional evening chats on the stairs. Ramadan was coming to embrace Jerusalem, and all of these preparations were made to welcome it. However, every person I spoke to in Jerusalem made sure to remind me not to be deceived by this calmness and tranquility, as Israel would provoke Muslims as it does every year during Ramadan.

And indeed, it happened as expected: Israeli occupation forces raided the Qibla Mosque, the most important section of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, with boots and weapons at midnight, beating dozens of young Palestinians with batons and arresting more than 200. Tension continued to rise throughout the morning. Israeli soldiers attacked Palestinians who were praying in front of the Qibla Mosque, pushing and shoving them and disrupting their prayers. In doing so, they exposed their own lie that they had to respond to attacks.

So why does Israel choose to attack during Ramadan?

The first answer to this question is that Ramadan is the time when Muslims gather at Al-Aqsa Mosque and in Jerusalem more intensely than any other time. Tarawih prayers, group iftars and suhoors, itikaf, conversations, fiery sermons and lectures, meetings... Since 1967, Israel has been trying to prevent Al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem from becoming a "center of attraction for Muslims," so during Ramadan, the occupation forces are particularly on high alert. The second answer to the question is, in a way, independent of Ramadan: the Israeli state uses the provocation of Palestinians as a method to divert attention from its internal political, social, and religious divisions, to mislead its target, and to consolidate the Jewish public around the common denominator of "Arab hostility". When the other side explodes, they ignite the fire with the outcry of "terrorists are even against our existence".

When we take a closer look at the resistance against the Israeli occupation in Jerusalem, Jenin, Nablus, and other cities, we must recognize an essential truth: there is a new generation of young people who are completely independent of the political factions and divisions within Palestine, and are focused on fighting their own battles with their own methods. They are dynamic, unmanageable, and do not subscribe to the political agendas of Hamas or Fatah. They refuse to join either camp as soldiers, having experienced firsthand the suffering caused by the occupation and witnessed countless tragedies for years. They do not tolerate the imposition of any prescriptions, and have a deep understanding of Israel and its weaknesses, which they target.

As long as the occupation continues, deprivation and violations persist, and people continue to suffer from oppression, the anger of Palestinian youth will not subside. Arresting, beating, torturing, imprisoning, and even killing them will not solve the problem. Therefore, we can easily answer one of the most common questions in the media language, "Will the events continue to escalate?" with "Yes, as long as these conditions persist."

Of course, Hamas and Fatah also have lessons to learn here. Hamas was born during the First Intifada in 1987 as a response to the weak struggle of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Fatah against Israel after years of tension. The young Palestinians, who were not taken seriously until then, stood up against the Israeli occupation with such strength that the Israeli government had to sit down with Yasser Arafat and his colleagues, whom they had previously considered as "terrorist leaders," and try to exclude Hamas. A similar "shift in the grassroots" is observed in Palestine today, just like in the process leading up to 1987. Whether Hamas and Fatah are aware of this is unknown.

Lastly, there is the issue of the "tools of attack seized from Palestinians" that the Israeli army showed to the world with the images released to the media after the night raid on the Al-Aqsa Mosque. A few fireworks, piles of stones in the corner, and sticks... I would like to address this issue within the framework of a special method that Israeli intelligence has been using for decades. If all goes well, we will continue from this point on Wednesday.