Is the PKK Iran's missing link?

February 8, 2025, Saturday… Two short news items appeared back-to-back in the media. The first was about a phone call between Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and his Iranian counterpart, A. Arakçi. It might seem like a routine report. But an hour later, the second news item surfaced, setting off alarm bells for my journalistic instincts.

According to this second report, MIT Head İbrahim Kalın had traveled to Tehran and met with Iranian Intelligence Minister I. Hatib and the Secretary General of the National Security Council, A. E. Ahmediyan. What were these two developments signaling? I looked into it. I found interesting information and analysis about recent Turkish-Iranian relations. I'll share that, but first, I need to highlight a few parameters about the background of these events.

One. Türkiye and Iran are two neighboring states with deep historical ties. Maintaining good relations is in the interest of both countries. However, there’s a long-standing competition between them. Competition can be healthy, but the delicate line to watch is this: threats to national security lead to hostility.

Two. Iran has taken the wrong side of history on two important issues. In Nagorno-Karabakh, it supported the military, economic, and political occupation of Muslim land. In Syria, it allied with Assad, a foreign, brutal regime fueled by a Ba'ath ideology. The U.S. invasion of Iraq gave Iran the opportunity to establish a resistance axis stretching from Iraq through Syria to Lebanon. Ironically, the Ba'ath ideology became the "keystone" of this resistance axis in Syria, but it was also a move of realpolitik.

Three. Azerbaijan’s victory in Karabakh caused Iran to lose ground. After October 7, regional shifts weakened Iran’s influence. The fall of Assad would destroy the resistance axis that Iran had been working for decades to build. This situation presented Iran with an opportunity to change its stance and support regional stability, but it seems that this opportunity will not be seized.

Four. Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei predicted that the people would initiate resistance against the new Syria (December 25). The Iranian Foreign Minister also warned, "Don’t rejoice too early." Recently, there were border clashes between the Syrian army and Hezbollah. Assad's wanted men have started forming armed groups to destabilize Damascus. We had written about Israel’s plan to remove Ahmad Shara and how PKK terrorists had expressed the same aim in Iran's semi-official news agency Mehr (see: The U.S. Pulled Out of That Camp in Syria, February 4).

Five. U.S. President Trump signed a maximum pressure decree against Iran. Israel would like to target Iran's nuclear capabilities, but Trump refrains from this. He has left the door open for nuclear negotiations.

This is the current situation. So, how can we interpret the recent diplomatic and intelligence traffic within this framework?

One. Iran wants a change in the current situation in Syria. But it is hedging its bets. Tehran is asking Ankara for support to improve Syria-Iran relations. They are saying, "Encourage Syria to talk to us."

Two. The erosion of regional power has created internal unrest in Iran. Tehran can’t communicate with anyone. The regional power balance has shifted towards the Ankara-Riyadh axis. For Iranian officials, appearing in the same frame as their Turkish counterparts sends the message, “Everything is fine, we’re still in the game.” There’s significant pressure for President Erdoğan to visit Tehran.

Three. I’ve been writing about this for weeks. Israel has been closely engaged with the PKK/SDF terrorist group. The group is speaking Israel’s language (see: PKK in Israel’s Lap, January 28). But that’s just one side of the coin. On the other side, we have Iran. In a realpolitik twist, PKK terrorists backed by Israel are using Iranian kamikaze drones to target Syrian National Army forces near the Tishrin Dam in Syria.

Four. We've discussed before Iran’s amorphous relationship with the PKK (Iran’s Difficult Issues, January 2024). Tehran wants the PKK to remain in a position that doesn’t pose a direct threat to them but will drain Türkiye's energy, with the group not laying down its weapons. Iran is trying to reinforce its lost ground in Syria, particularly the Lebanon-bound resistance axis, by building up the PKK. In other words, Tehran is attempting to replace the missing link in Syria with the PKK. This is a significant piece of information that needs further attention.

Where does the video message from the leader in İmralı, which has yet to be published, fit into this picture? And what about the mixed signals from SDG/PKK to Damascus? Murat Karayılan’s statement, “Let’s say Öcalan made a call. Will everything end with just one call?”—where do these statements fit in? Before the organization surrenders, it’s assessing its surroundings. It sees Israel and Iran as life preservers. That’s why the group is delaying its response to the call to lay down arms. But as they say, tough situations call for tough decisions.