Abu Duhur attack: Israel's quest for regional supremacy

Israel's strike on Abu Duhur in Syria carries meaning beyond the targeting of a military facility. While countries like Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are taking concrete steps in response to the need for a new regional order—made visible and urgent once again by America's Iran war—Israel emerges as an actor seeking to preserve its operational freedom absolutely. As American power proves insufficient not only in producing regional order but also becomes a source of instability itself, Washington's privileged ally in the region, Israel, moves against initiatives to establish regional order. The system Israel prefers can be described as a hierarchical structure where Tel Aviv can unilaterally define threats, use cross-border force, and decide what weapons its neighbors may possess. Particularly after the October 7 attacks, Israel is trying to make permanent the de facto situation it has created and demands that its supremacy be accepted by all regional countries. Thus, for Israel, the issue is not the establishment of a regional order that brings stability, but making Israeli supremacy unquestionable.

THE EROSION OF AMERICA'S ORDER-BUILDING CAPACITY

For many years, America shaped the Middle East through bilateral alliances, military bases, security guarantees, military intervention, and wars. The America factor, which caused the region to oscillate between stability and chaos periodically, stood out for regional powers as both an indispensable power and an unreliable actor. The fact that its special relationship with Israel sometimes manifested even against American interests forced regional countries into a friend-enemy dilemma with Israel. Options such as Israel's integration into the region as a normal country and establishing normal relations with Israel could not come to the agenda as a result of America's 'special' relationship.

America's capacity in the region is gradually eroding, and we see Israel becoming more aggressive accordingly. The continuation of America's military capacity and presence does not mean it can direct regional politics. Washington is both unwilling and unsuccessful in converting its military power into political authority. Failing to produce a lasting solution in Gaza, America could not prevent the conflict from spreading to Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and the Gulf, becoming regionalized. The Trump administration, which tried to invest in Syria's stability through cooperation with Türkiye, could not prevent Israel from systematically targeting this country's military and institutional capacity. At points where America cannot set the limits of Israel's unilateral actions—as in the Abu Duhur attack—it tries to manage their consequences.

A RESPONSE TO THE MECCA AGREEMENT?

How the common defense principle envisaged in the Mecca Agreement will manifest, its operational obligations, command structure, and mechanisms have not yet been clarified. The fact that Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan want to take steps toward building a new regional security architecture does not mean it is directed against Israel, but it is clear that it would not be compatible with a regional architecture based on Israel's absolute freedom of movement and supremacy. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that Israel is acting with the aim of intervening preemptively in a potential political and security network that could limit its unilateral maneuverability, especially given the possibility that the agreement may later include Egypt and Syria. In an environment where American leadership is increasingly weakening, Israel is trying to eliminate obstacles to its almost unlimited freedom of action before they even emerge.

Syria emerges as the place where these two different regional visions meet and clash. Syria, as preferred by Türkiye—stable, independent, preserving its territorial integrity, and having a central government—is seen from Tel Aviv as a potential that could limit Israel's absolute freedom of movement. Israel, which has repeatedly targeted Syria's military infrastructure, is trying to determine which units Damascus can deploy where, which weapons it can possess, and with which countries it can establish defense relations. Ironically, Syria's ability to defend its own airspace as a sovereign state is seen as a threat because it makes it harder for Israel to violate that airspace. Thus, an equation emerges where Israel's security is tied to the insecurity and military weakness of its neighbors.

Arguing a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the Abu Duhur attack and the Mecca Agreement may be a forced interpretation, as Israel's attacks on Syria are not new. However, the statements and implications from Israeli leadership that this attack was meant to deter Ankara appear to be aimed at testing Türkiye's potential as a security partner for Syria and other countries. The Netanyahu administration's actions under election schedule pressure can be read as an effort both to impose Israel's own red lines on the region and to force Türkiye to take a step that would not be seen as responsible or measured. Israel, which does not want a rules-based order mutually observed in the region, prefers a hierarchical relationship where its supremacy is accepted.

Israel, which not only turned the Gaza war into an ethnic cleansing operation after the October 7 attacks but also spread the war across the region, wants to maintain the freedom of movement it gained through this policy. The Netanyahu government, trying to show that it is willing to risk military conflict even against any formation that could limit or deter this, is trying to block regional order-building efforts. By effectively declaring that it will not allow Syria to become a truly sovereign state, Israel is sending the message that it may also target regional powers seeking stability and peace in an era of weakened American leadership.