Israel's "Turkish threat": paranoia born of aggression—but that doesn't mean Israel isn't being watched

Israel's attacks on Syria have now crossed a line where they can no longer be explained by the "Iran threat" or classic security justifications. When Iran was at its strongest in Syria—with all its military, intelligence, and Hezbollah assets—Israel never felt such a great threat. Only when Bashar al-Assad, who kept Iran in the country, was overthrown and replaced by a government representing the Syrian people, did Israel begin to feel and attack what it calls the greatest threats from Syria.

Meanwhile, the strike on the Abu Duhur Military Airbase in the Idlib countryside, quite close to the Turkish border, shows the extent of the intervention limit Israel has granted itself. Of course, it is clear that this limit it has granted itself is, in every respect, an impertinence. Turning even another country's installation of radar or air defense systems on its own soil into a justification for attack is no longer a defense reflex but a matter of rampant aggression that needs to be addressed.

An article published in the Jerusalem Post under the signature of David M. Weinberg reveals in all its nakedness where this mentality has reached. The author says that Israel may one day face "Turkish tanks" in the Golan and "Turkish frigates" off the coast of Caesarea; presents the attack in Idlib as a necessary message to Türkiye; and finally utters this chilling sentence: "From Idlib to Istanbul, if necessary, Israel will strike."

Israel's casual articulation that it can strike a city of a NATO country is not an expression of being under threat, but of a spoiled arrogance that sees itself above all international boundaries. Like all spoiled entities, it is unaware that it is racing toward its own end at an unparalleled speed.

Moreover, when the logic of the article is closely examined, the nature of what is called the "Turkish threat" also becomes clear. Türkiye developing its navy is a threat; building new frigates and submarines is a threat; developing its own fighter jet is a threat; helping Syria strengthen its air defense is a threat; developing defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is a threat...

In short, Türkiye's growing strength is in itself a threat for Israel.

The truth here is that Israel's real problem is not even the possibility of Türkiye attacking Israel. It is Türkiye reaching a capacity that would complicate the regional order Israel wants—one where Israel can attack whenever it wishes.

This is precisely the meaning of the Idlib attack. Israel considers its freedom to act as it pleases in Syrian airspace as almost an acquired right. Syria having radar and air defense systems capable of controlling its own airspace is described as "hindering the operations of the Israeli Air Force." Israel essentially sees as its right to do everything it can do. What it can do without encountering an obstacle has become an acquired right for it. History has not recorded such an arrogant and rampant occupier.

Syria cannot establish a system to defend its own country, because it could limit Israel's "freedom" to bomb Syria whenever it wants!

The shape Israel's security understanding is increasingly taking is this: my neighbors' vulnerability is my security. Therefore, Syria's recovery is a threat, Türkiye's strengthening is a threat, and regional countries developing defense mechanisms among themselves is considered a threat.

Our colleague Selçuk Türkyılmaz also draws attention to an important point while evaluating the Idlib attack. He says that Israel has long tried to gain strategic superiority by dragging Palestinians and neighboring countries into conflict at times and conditions of its own choosing, when they are unprepared; and that it is exerting similar pressure on the new Syrian administration. The fact that the Damascus administration has not fallen into this trap and that new regional defense initiatives involving Türkiye have emerged creates an unusual situation for Israel.

Because the Middle East Israel is used to is a fragmented Middle East. Syria will be weak, Iraq will be preoccupied with its own issues, Gulf countries will be suspicious of each other, Türkiye will stay away from regional affairs, and Israel will be able to enter the airspace of any country and strike any target it wants.

When this order begins to break down, Israel's "security concern" increases. The depiction of Türkiye in Weinberg's article is therefore less a rational threat analysis and more a text of strategic paranoia. Claims that Erdoğan has established a pan-Islamic front encompassing Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, and partly Egypt; that he is preparing an Islamic confederation to replace NATO; that he is ready to join Iran's war against Israel—these are listed one after another. Even Türkiye's relations with Russia, China, and Iran are narrated almost as parts of a single grand plan to encircle Israel.

More importantly, the intolerance created in this discourse by Türkiye's military and technological achievements in recent years is clearly expressed.

Instead of the Türkiye that was once forced to obtain its defense systems from elsewhere, there is now a Türkiye that develops its own UAVs, UCAVs, warships, frigates, submarines, and fighter jets. It is inevitable that this capacity will change the balance of power in the region.

There is another dimension Türkyılmaz points to. The reaction produced in European, and especially British, public opinion by Israel's war in Gaza since October 7 has turned into a serious loss of legitimacy for Israel. Türkyılmaz evaluates the relationship of England and Germany with Israel beyond simple "support" and draws attention to the fact that the growing social reaction against Israel could be counterbalanced by re-circulating old anti-Turkish images. This comment can, of course, be debated separately; but Weinberg's article provides a striking example to make this possibility thinkable: Israel suddenly portrays itself as surrounded by Turkish tanks in the Golan and Turkish warships off the coast of Caesarea.

Yet today, it was not Türkiye that bombed Idlib; it was Israel. It was not Türkiye that violated Syrian airspace; it was Israel. Then the aggressor presents itself as the victim of an imaginary future Turkish attack.

This is precisely the strategic impasse Israel is increasingly falling into. A country that ties its own security to the weakness of the entire region is doomed to see every recovery around it as a threat.

Syria's re-emergence as a state becomes a threat. Türkiye's strengthening becomes a threat. Regional cooperation becomes a threat. Even neighbors having air defense systems capable of defending themselves against Israeli attacks becomes a threat.

This is not security; it is a demand for unlimited supremacy.

But this is what Israel now needs to get used to: the Middle East is not a no-man's land where Israel can bomb any country it wants at any time. Türkiye's strengthening is also a sign that unilateral, rampant, and aggressive use of force in the region will increasingly encounter limits.